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THE INTELLIGENCE AND RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON, 1935-1965:  
LOST IN TIME

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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B.A. Saint Norbert College, DePere, Wisconsin, 1981

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
1994

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The Intelligence and reconnaissance Platoon,  
1935-1965: Lost in Time

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This study investigates the roles, missions, and functions of the infantry regiment's Intelligence and Reconnaissance (I&R) platoon. The investigation begins in 1935 and ends with the I&R platoon's disappearance from infantry force structure in 1965. The present infantry brigade remains the only tactical formation without an organic human intelligence collection and reconnaissance organization. What were the reasons that it was removed from the infantry brigade force structure? Period I&R platoon doctrine, training, and tables of organization are compared and contrasted with first hand combat experiences from World War II and Korea. The impact of national security policy, strategic and tactical nuclear weapons and intra-service rivalries about individual U.S. armed forces capabilities and missions during the Cold War are also examined. The study concludes that the I&R platoon's disappearance began with its tactical employment during the Korean War. Later during the PENTANA study in the late 1950s, the I&R platoon had lost so many personnel billets, that it was no longer a tactically effective organization.

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

THE INTELLIGENCE AND RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON, 1935-1965: LOST IN TIME  
by Major Richard J. Runde, Jr., USA, 119 pages.

This study investigates the roles, missions, and functions of the infantry regiment's Intelligence and Reconnaissance (I&R) platoon. The investigation begins in 1935 and ends with the I&R platoon's disappearance from infantry force structure in 1965. The present infantry brigade remains the only tactical formation without an organic human intelligence collection and reconnaissance organization. What were the reasons that it was removed from the infantry brigade force structure?

Period I&R platoon doctrine, training, and tables of organization are compared and contrasted with first-hand combat experiences from WW II and Korea. The impact of national security policy, strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, and intra-service rivalries about individual U.S. armed forces capabilities and missions during the cold war are also examined.

This study concludes that the I&R platoon's disappearance began with its tactical employment during the Korean War. Later during the PENTANA study in the late 1950s, the I&R platoon was dramatically reorganized twice. By 1963, the I&R platoon had lost so many personnel billets, that it was no longer a tactically effective organization.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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To the United States Army Infantry School, for the privilege to teach and continue the study of the profession of arms through both practical application as an instructor and as a doctrine writer. Secondly, to the Infantry School's Donovan Technical Library and staff, for their very generous flexibility and their support of my research requests and requirements.

To my wife Meg, thank you for your extraordinary strength and never ending encouragement and support throughout this research, writing, and publication.

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## CHAPTER ONE

### AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INFANTRY REGIMENT INTELLIGENCE AND RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON: LOST IN TIME

The Persian Gulf War was the U.S. Army's most recent experience with mechanized desert warfare since World War II (WW II). Minor mechanized formations were employed in the Korean War; however, the mountainous terrain of the Northeast Asian Peninsula put severe limitations on their employment and placed the burden of fighting on the infantryman. While a U.S. Army infantry brigade must be prepared to fight on all types of terrain and under all types of conditions, the desert may be considered the purest of conditions to prosecute ground combat. As such, it offers some of the best conditions under which to validate U.S. Army doctrine, tactical formations, organizations, and training. Conversely, that same U.S. Army infantry brigade would face considerably different, and perhaps equally rigorous, tactical challenges if it had to fight in the mountains of Eastern Europe, the jungles of Central America, the vast tundra of the arctic, or any battlefield that exploited the effects of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. The desert is a unique battlefield environment.

The desert allows a brigade commander to employ his forces to their doctrinal norms in time and space. Movement formations can be extended to their limits, in both scope and tempo of operations. Maximum effective ranges and standoff for direct fire weapons and target

acquisition systems can be achieved. The desert terrain places almost no restrictions on a commander's freedom to maneuver. For the first time in nearly 50 years, corps, division, and brigade commanders fought their tactical formations against an armed opponent, and not against a rehearsed opposing force or a computer simulation. It is out of this most recent combat experience that the cry for a brigade intelligence, reconnaissance, and security element was again surfaced.

Infantry Regiment Intelligence and Reconnaissance. The U.S. Army infantry regiment had an organic intelligence and reconnaissance (I&R), platoon from the mid-1930s until the late 1950s. From then until the early 1960s, as the infantry regiment was eventually replaced with the infantry battle group organization, the intelligence and reconnaissance platoon was pared down in size and eventually eliminated from the infantry brigade force structure.

As the U.S. Army entered the Vietnam War, the infantry brigade was without an organic human intelligence collection and reconnaissance capability for the first time since its conception. An infantry brigade commander during the Vietnam War relied on corps allocated Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRPS), for his human intelligence and reconnaissance needs, or he tasked one of his subordinate units. During the Vietnam War some division commanders allocated an air-cavalry asset to an infantry brigade commander for limited reconnaissance and security missions. Commonly referred to as "Blues Platoons" these organizations most frequently were employed as quick reaction combat force or were used to develop tactical situations. Accordingly, these forces were most often involved in direct action combat operations, or

reconnaissance in force, in order to gain knowledge of the enemy, and not human intelligence collection as conducted by an infantry reconnaissance platoon. At present, there is no intelligence, reconnaissance, and or security force in any of the five infantry brigade tables of organization and equipment (TO&Es) of the U.S. Army.

The Evolution of Infantry Brigade Human Intelligence Collection and Reconnaissance. The U.S. Army had an I&R platoon at the infantry regiment and Regimental Combat Team (RCT) level, from WW II through the Korean War. Between the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the I&R platoon was removed from the infantry regiment's force structure. From the early 1960s until the present, the infantry brigade has had no organic human intelligence and reconnaissance collection capability. After-action reports from serving infantry brigade commanders of the recent Persian Gulf War state that their tactical formations required organic reconnaissance and security forces for combat operations. The present infantry brigade remains the only tactical formation without its own human reconnaissance and intelligence organization.

The Problem. How did the present infantry brigade force structure become the only tactical formation without its own human intelligence and reconnaissance element? Are Persian Gulf War commander's observations and comments on the need for some type of reconnaissance and security element at the brigade level, unique to modern conflicts and tactical operations? Is this a force structure problem the U.S. Army recognized once before, and solved based on its previous combat experiences? Or is this possibly the forecast for an infantry brigade force structure transition away from the cold war

orientation? Why was the I&R platoon removed from the force structure in the transition from the infantry regiment, to the battle group, and finally the brigade?

The Primary Research Question. What were the factors that led the U.S. Army to remove the infantry regiment's intelligence and reconnaissance platoon from the post Korean War infantry regiment and battle group force structure? This research was based on the assumption that there remains a need for such an organization at the infantry brigade level. Pre-Korean War infantry regimental commanders, like all other maneuver formation commanders, needed a human intelligence and reconnaissance organization to confirm or deny military intelligence derived from other collection sources.

Some serving infantry brigade commander's during DESERT STORM went so far as to create their own, ad-hoc, brigade level human intelligence collection and reconnaissance organizations. These tactical intelligence gathering organizations were most often created out of existing tactical U.S. Army force structure. The assumption is made that because other, normally more sophisticated sources of combat intelligence collection and dissemination did not keep up with the tempo of modern mechanized combat operations. These brigade commanders felt the need to create additional intelligence collection, reconnaissance and security organizations specifically for this purpose. Conversely, other reconnaissance and security organizations, at either higher (division) or subordinate levels (battalion) did not meet the infantry brigade commanders intelligence collection and reconnaissance needs.

If the infantry regiment needed an intelligence collection and reconnaissance organization before, (during World War II, the Korean War and up until the Vietnam War), the assumption can be made that DESERT STORM infantry brigade commander's after-action reports are echoes from the past that may need to be heeded.

Research Focus. The Korean War period was perhaps the pivotal point in the redesign and rapid modernization of U.S. Army force structure after World War II. It was after the Korean War that the infantry regiment's I&R platoon was removed from the TO&E. The U.S. Army's infantry regiment's combat experiences in the Korean War were probably not the only reason for the loss of the infantry regiment's I&R platoon. The period between 1950 and 1960 was not only turbulent for the U.S. Army. Political, social, economic, and military issues all combined to spawn and fuel the cold war. Some of the key events that affected the loss of the I&R platoon include:

Between the loss of the infantry regiment and the adoption of the infantry brigade, there was the short lived fielding of the infantry battle group formation and the PENTOMIC division.

The rapid pace of nuclear proliferation, between former WW II allies, to include employment at both the strategic and tactical level, may have contributed to the ultimate demise of the I&R platoon.

During the same post Korean War period of force structure redesign, the U.S. Army was also being reduced in size. The I&R platoon may have become a bill payer for the retention of other U.S. Army force structure.

It is important first to consider how the infantry regiment's I&R platoon evolved, and what it was designed to do. An investigation into the history of the I&R platoon is included. The research begins with the WW II infantry regimental organization, its training and doctrine and practices and experiences in combat. While the focus is initially on the origins of the I&R platoon, and its operations in WW II, the research shifts to the 1950's and the relationship of the U.S. Army to the other military services, and to the economical and political situation of that period.

Primary Subordinate Research Questions. In order to answer the primary research question, there are several supporting research questions that first had to be answered:

How did an infantry regimental commander gain the necessary tactical human intelligence about the terrain and enemy during WW II and the Korean War?

What were the differences between the infantry battle group commander's tactical human intelligence and reconnaissance requirements when faced with both an atomic and non-atomic battlefield of the cold war?

The Hypothesis. The U.S. Army infantry regiment's I&R platoon was removed from the U.S. Army force structure based on the changing world threats of the Korean and cold war era, which the U.S. Army had the responsibility to fight and win.

The review of available literature on this period leads me to believe that the infantry regiment's I&R platoon was probably removed as a result of a combination of many factors. With the advent of both

strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, an inevitable arms race erupted through out the world. As a result a complete change in U.S. Army war fighting doctrine, with an even greater reliance on firepower and attrition, was developed and tested. This had a direct impact on tactical U.S. Army force structure, albeit for a rather short period of time. Within five years of fielding the battle group, the brigade structure was introduced to replace it. With it the battalion was also reintroduced as an intermediate command and control headquarters between the company and the brigade, and the I&R platoon was lost.

The Central Definitions. The understanding of this thesis is based on some common tactical military language. Several terms require immediate definition; reconnaissance, security, intelligence, and combat intelligence. The universal understanding of this thesis is based on agreement as to the meaning of these key terms, particularly as regards the relationship of the infantry regiment's I&R platoon, and its tactical employment. The definitions to these terms are as described in current, published, U.S. Army doctrine.

**Reconnaissance:** A mission undertaken to obtain information by visual observation, or other detection methods, about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or about the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area.<sup>1</sup>

**Security:** 1. Measures taken by a military unit, an activity, or an installation to protect itself against all acts designed to, or that may, impair its effectiveness. 2. A condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or from hostile acts or influences.<sup>2</sup>

**Intelligence:** The product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all available information concerning an enemy force, foreign nations,



or areas of operations, and which is immediately or potentially significant to military planning and operations.<sup>3</sup>

Combat Intelligence: That knowledge of the enemy, weather, and geographical features required by a commander, in planning and conducting combat operations. It is derived from the analysis of information on the enemy's capabilities, intentions, vulnerabilities, and the environment.<sup>4</sup>

The Limitations and Delimitations. This thesis will limit its scope to the modern, (pre-WW II and later), infantry regiment and brigade structures. It will not address purely tank and or armored organizations. It encompasses an analysis of the U.S. Army infantry regiment and brigade level organizations from WW II to the present. It examines the doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures, for reconnaissance and security from the infantry company through the division level. The aim was to compare and contrast the responsibilities and requirements at each tactical level for reconnaissance, intelligence collection and security.

The Research Approach. This research uses an historical approach to determine how the U.S. Army arrived at the present day infantry brigade force structure; noticeably without an organic human intelligence collection and reconnaissance element. By looking back on the U.S. Army's tactical combat experiences and previous infantry organizations, doctrine and tactics we can begin to answer questions about the needs and requirements of an infantry brigade commander on future conventional battlefields. The specific focus is on the need for an organic intelligence collection and reconnaissance organization. If it was seen as necessary before, why did it go away? Has the U.S. Army come full circle in its realization that there is a gap in the existing infantry force structure, specifically with regard to an organic brigade

level human intelligence collection and reconnaissance organization?  
Are the comments and realizations of commanders from the Persian Gulf War new; or are they lessons that were re-learned because of the long lapse of practiced conventional combat experience at the brigade, division and corps levels?

The Outcome. While looking back into history will never predict with 100% reliability what the future battlefield will pose for an infantry brigade commander, it can serve as a starting point. All too frequently this reflection has not been done in as complete a fashion as possible. Sometimes this is done within the confines of personal experience, tainted by either defeat or more often than not, -- victory. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war, the fear of a war that includes tactical and strategic nuclear warheads has eased considerably. There were no strategic or tactical nuclear weapons fired on any of the cold war battlefields. Korea, Lebanon, the Cuban Missile Crisis, Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf War were all resolved using conventional U.S. Army infantry brigades and did not use nuclear weapons. In retrospect, if one were to compare World War II tactical ground combat experiences to the Persian Gulf War, nothing is new in the principles of the fundamental prosecution of conventional armed ground combat.


### Endnotes

1. U.S. Department of the Army, FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 21 October 1985), p. 1-60.

2. Ibid., p. 1-64.

3. Ibid., p. 1-39.

4. Ibid., p. 1-55.



## CHAPTER TWO

### A LITERATURE REVIEW

I found no other specific research or writings on the subject of the removal of the I&R platoon from the infantry force structure. The core of the research information came from published U.S. Army doctrinal field manuals (FMs), TO&Es, unclassified U.S. Army studies, reports and historical analysis, and evaluations from the period as a whole. A highlight was the first-hand experiences of an I&R squad leader with an infantry regiment assigned to the 79th Infantry Division in WW II, With The I&R Platoon. 315th Infantry Regiment in WW II. The accuracy of his testimony was supported in the 79th Infantry Division's official combat history, The Cross of the Lorraine. A personal interview with a Korean War I&R platoon veteran, Dr. Jack Gifford of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas faculty is included in this research. The purpose was to compare and contrast the roles, missions, and functions of the infantry regimental I&R platoon as described in U.S. Army doctrine and as practiced during the Korean War and WW II.

The research literature was readily available in the Combined Arms Research Library at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and at the Donovan Technical Library of the United States Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia. During the course of this research, I encountered an abundance of classified studies, reports, and analysis surrounding the

atomic period between 1950-1960. In an effort to keep this thesis unclassified, I did not incorporate any classified information. Adequate open source literature was available to answer the primary and subordinate research questions.

U.S. Army doctrinal changes that impacted on the evolution of the I&R platoon were found in the keystone war fighting manuals FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations (1942 & 1954), and FM 100-5 Operations (1962).

Primary military sources for the research of the evolution of the I&R platoon were the Infantry School's family of Field Manuals (FMs): FM 7-10, The Infantry Rifle Company (1942), FM 7-19, Combat Support Company Infantry Division Battle Group (1942 & 1950), FM 7-20, The Infantry Rifle Battalion (1942), FM 7-25, Headquarters Company, Intelligence and Signal Communication, the Rifle Regiment (1941, 1942, & 1950); FM 7-30, The Infantry Brigade (1962, & 1965); FM 7-40, The Infantry Regiment (1942 & 1950); and finally, FM 7-40, The Infantry Battle Group (1959).

Research into the roles, functions, and missions of the infantry division's intelligence collection, reconnaissance, and security organizations was incorporated from the following FMs: FM 17-22, Reconnaissance Platoon and Reconnaissance Company, (1950); FM 17-35, Reconnaissance Battalion (1951); FM 17-35, Armored Cavalry, Platoon, Troop and Squadron (1960); FM 61-100, The Division (1962). These manuals outlined the command and support relationships among the infantry regiment, the battle group, the brigade, and the division, with regards to human intelligence collection, reconnaissance, and security.

The research analyzed the results and impact of the U.S. Army maneuvers prior to its involvement in WW II and after the Korean War. The research focused on training and force structure changes made as a result of these maneuvers in preparation for future wars and force structure design and reorganization. The two primary sources of information for these exercises were: The U.S. Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941 and A History of Large Scale Maneuvers in the United States, 1935-1964.

In order to understand the employment and tactics used by the infantry in the Korean War, I relied on three primary sources: This Kind of War, The Korean War: History and Tactics, and the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army's, Official Military History of the Korean War.

For research into the overall military, political, social, and economic impact of the period, and their impacts on the U.S. Army, several primary sources were consulted: The Pentomic Era, The Evolution of U.S. Army Nuclear Doctrine, The Origins of Nuclear Strategy, From Trust to Terror, The Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1950, and Tactical Nuclear Weapons: An Examination of the Issues.

The U.S. Army infantry division organization changed several times during the research period of 1935-1963. The research analyzed and compared the organizational changes as outlined in the official U.S. Army TO&Es, for the infantry battalion, regiment, battle group, brigade, and division throughout the period.

The U.S. Army underwent a dramatic down-sizing effort after WW II. Yet, the infantry regiment's I&R platoon survived largely in tact.

This research describes how the U.S. Army was down-sized after WW II and specifically the impact it had on the infantry regiment's reorganization.

Post Korean War nuclear proliferation and an eventual super-power nuclear imbalance drove the U.S. Army reorganization study titled PENTANA from the mid-1950s until 1960. During this period the infantry regiment's I&R platoon was initially increased in size and combat capability. Almost as quickly as its force structure grew, the I&R platoon was removed from infantry force structure. Here, the research began to focus on the changes to the U.S. Army's keystone war fighting doctrine: FM 100-5, Operations (1954). During this period the U.S. Army wrestled with the application of conventional tactical war fighting doctrine on both an atomic and non-atomic battlefield. The infantryman's battlefield now included not only strategic nuclear weapons, but tactical weapons as well. During this complicated period of our military and political history, the I&R platoon was removed from the infantry force structure.



## CHAPTER THREE

### THE RESEARCH DESIGN

This research took on both a historical and a tactical application focus. The research is conducted in a chronological fashion. It begins with the pre-WW II I&R platoon in 1939 and traced its way through the Korean War, from 1950-1953, and ended when it was removed by 1963. The research is broken into three major periods: WW II, 1939-1945; post WW II through the Korean War, 1945-1960; and the early Vietnam period, 1960-1963.

For each period, the research began with an examination of the U.S. Army's latest war fighting doctrine, FM 100-5. The research then turned to the I&R platoon TO&E. Within the framework of what it was made of, I was better able to understand what it was required to do by each echelon's appropriate doctrinal field manuals. This was then tempered with the first hand war time accounts, in order to compare and contrast what was written in U.S. Army doctrine with what was actually practiced in combat during WW II and the Korean War.

Several historical sources were researched in order to understand the onset of the cold war 1945-1960. The sources chosen for the research each focused on different perspectives in order to gain an overall appreciation of the entire problem. Historical perspectives ranged from the impact on the U.S. Army, considerations on the employment of tactical nuclear weapons, strategic nuclear weapons and

their capabilities, and the geo-political, economic and social issues surrounding the period.

This thorough research approach enveloped the hypothesis from both the top and the bottom. From the bottom the tactical application of the I&R platoon as a part of the military instrument of power, and from the top the enormous impact that the economic and political instruments of power had over the U.S. Army at that time.

Research into the early atomic era proved to be the most productive. The early atomic era, with its overwhelming reliance on both tactical and strategic nuclear weapons sent the U.S. Army searching for new roles, functions, and missions. Never before had reliance on superior technology threatened the role of an army. Radical changes to the U.S. Army force structure were considered, and many were adopted with the conclusions from the early PENTANA studies. These studies sought to define a role for conventional ground forces on an atomic battlefield. The U.S. Army division experienced three different organizations in less than ten years. These studies provided the key into the decision to remove the infantry regiment's I&R platoon from infantry force structure.

The primary research focus was based on several key subordinate research questions. Listed below, they are answered in Chapter Four:

How did an infantry regimental commander gain the required tactical human intelligence about the terrain and enemy before, during, and immediately after WW II?

What were the roles, functions, and missions of the Infantry Regiment's I&R platoon, prior to WW II?

What were the roles, functions and missions of the Infantry Regiment's I&R platoon during and after WW II? Did they change; if so, how?

Was the tactical employment of the infantry brigade so different between WW II and the Korean War that an infantry brigade commander would not require his own intelligence, reconnaissance, and or security force?

Was the infantry regiment's reconnaissance platoon removed in the transition to the infantry brigade structure, because the intended design of the infantry brigade was not to be a fixed organization? (The infantry brigade was to be assigned tactical combat forces based on the mission it was assigned.)

Was the infantry regiment's reconnaissance platoon removed as a part of the PENTANA study initiative in response to the proliferation of nuclear weapons?

Was the division reconnaissance and, later cavalry squadron created, designed, and task-organized to meet the intelligence and reconnaissance requirements of the division commander and the infantry regiment, battle group, brigade commander simultaneously?

What were the specific political factors that influenced the Truman and Eisenhower administrations in relationship to the down sizing of the U.S. Army, in comparison to our other sister armed services? What were the specific economic factors that influenced the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, in relationship to the down sizing of the U.S. Army in comparison to our other sister services? Finally, was

there an outcry from the American public of the time for another "peace dividend" through the reduction in defense spending?

What were the specific military factors that influenced the U.S. Army's decision to remove the infantry regiment's I&R platoon from its force structure?

Did the U.S. Army's tactical reliance on firepower as the essential element of combat power, negate the requirement for an organic regimental, battle group, brigade level intelligence collection and reconnaissance organization?

The conclusion of this historical research draws comparisons and contrasts between the decision to remove the I&R platoon from the infantry regiment's force structure over thirty years ago and questions the validity of the need to create a new brigade level I&R platoon.

Were the reasons that the I&R platoon was removed from infantry force structure after the Korean War sound, when reviewed in the light of present war fighting doctrine and tactics? While some of the threats have changed for the United States in many cases, the U.S. Army has come full circle with regards to conventional war fighting. Finally, the U.S. Army is dramatically down sizing again. There are lessons to be learned from the U.S. Army's post Korean War simultaneous down sizing and reorganization experiences.

The strength of this research methodology is that it is grounded in military doctrinal publications and easily accessible publications and credible resources. The analysis follows a chronological time line that links the geopolitical, economic, and social environments to the military and specifically the U.S. Army, in

time and space. This makes the analysis logical, easy to follow, and understand. The research covers a period of development in our country's history that was to shape the entire world's course for over forty years.

The weaknesses of this research are twofold. First, due to the need to keep the thesis unclassified, the classified PENTANA studies and analysis from the early atomic period could not be thoroughly researched or included in this research and analysis.

Second, the research that resulted in enclosure of only two first-hand accounts of the combat experiences I&R platoons in WW II and the Korean War. I was unable to uncover any others. More first-hand accounts might have identified more differences or similarities between the doctrinal tactics, techniques for the employment of the I&R platoon, and its actual execution of tactical operations in combat. While more would have been desirable, the fact that they are different personal accounts from the only two wars of the research period, nullify this deficiency to a reasonable degree. Neither of the weaknesses in this research are enough to discredit or disqualify the conclusions posed in the thesis conclusion.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE HISTORY OF THE INFANTRY REGIMENT'S INTELLIGENCE AND RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON: 1939 - 1965

#### The Beginning 1939-1945: World War II

The following is a brief chronology of key events that impacted on the I&R platoon during this period:

- 1939 The MANHATTAN project was initiated under President Roosevelt.
- 1939-41 The triangular infantry division tested against the existing square infantry division.
- 1939 The I&R platoon TO&E was authorized 10 infantrymen.
- 1940 The I&R platoon TO&E was expanded to authorize 18 infantrymen.
- 1940 The Infantry Regimental Combat Team (RCT) concept developed.
- 1941 Sept.- Nov., U.S. Army GHQ Louisiana and Carolina Maneuvers were conducted.
- 1941 The I&R platoon TO&E was authorized 1/4 ton vehicles.
- 1942 FM 100-15, Division Operations was re-written.
- 1942 Field Service Regulation 100-15 Operations was rewritten.
- 1942 U.S.A. enters WW II in North Africa.
- 1945 On Aug. 6 & 9, the U.S.A. employed the first atomic weapons.
- 1945 At the close of hostilities the U.S. Army had 6,100,000 personnel, in 89 divisions. The Soviet Union retains 175 divisions capable of mobilization.

During this period every tactical infantry formation, from platoon through division, included a reconnaissance and surveillance organization. Each infantry company had two trained scouts in every

rifle platoon. Every infantry battalion had a small trained reconnaissance section, directed by the battalion intelligence officer (S-2). Each infantry regiment included a small I&R platoon, specifically trained and dedicated to answering the reconnaissance and intelligence needs of the infantry regiment's commander. This platoon was assigned to the headquarters company of the infantry regiment, charged with the following mission:

The principle mission of the regimental intelligence platoon is to serve as the special intelligence agency of the regimental commander, for the collection, recording, evaluation and dissemination of information, under the supervision of the regimental intelligence officer (S-2). The platoon is also charged with counterintelligence measures and surveillance. During training periods it may be required to assist the S-2 in conducting intelligence and counterintelligence instruction within the regiment.<sup>1</sup>

In short, the I&R platoon provided the human eyes and ears for the regimental commander. The I&R platoon received its orders and missions from the regimental commander, the S-3 or the S-2.

In 1940, the infantry battalion's intelligence staff section, located at the battalion headquarters, consisted of only one Technical Sergeant (E-6), one sergeant (E-4), and six corporals (E-3s). Only three individuals in this section were trained and capable of performing as scouts in the field. The majority of the tactical reconnaissance for the battalion was the responsibility of the rifle companies. Each rifle platoon had two scouts trained in reconnaissance, for a total of six scouts per rifle company. Among the three rifle companies within the battalion, there were a total of twenty one scouts available for reconnaissance taskings. These individual scouts were not trained to

operate together nor were they drawn together into a platoon. There was no command and control headquarters to organize such a formation.<sup>2</sup>

After the U. S. Army General Headquarters Maneuvers of 1941, the triangular infantry division was adopted. This formation included a reconnaissance company as part of the division troops. The company was organized and operated in a similar fashion as the I&R platoon of the infantry regiment. (See Figures 1 and 2 for a line diagram comparison of the square infantry division and the triangular infantry division organization in 1941.) By including a reconnaissance and intelligence formation in the design of a tactical infantry formation, one can infer that each tactical echelon required its own intelligence and reconnaissance organization. (See Figure 3 for a line diagram of the infantry regiment organization in 1942.)

As a result of the U.S. Army General Headquarters Maneuvers of 1941, the minor reconnaissance formations grew. The infantry regiment I&R platoon grew in size during this period. The 1939 Table of Organization (WD 7-12) authorized only ten enlisted personnel and no vehicles for the intelligence platoon. Going into the Louisiana and Carolina Maneuvers in 1941, the organization almost doubled in size, and the term "reconnaissance" became part of its title. (Up until this time, it was known only as the "Intelligence Platoon.")<sup>3</sup> Organized under Table of Organization 7-12, dated 01 October 1940, the I&R platoon was authorized eighteen enlisted personnel, with a technical sergeant (E-6) in charge, but still no vehicles. The platoon consisted of two squads. Each squad was led by a Staff Sergeant (E-5), who was also trained as a draftsman. The squad leader had two E-4s (sergeants), each



in charge of a scout team. Six corporals (E-3s), were divided between the two teams, and served as scouts. (See Figure 4 for a line diagram of the I&R platoon organization in 1942.) Noticeably absent from the pre-WW II I&R platoon force structure was an officer to serve as the platoon leader. The infantry regiment's intelligence officer served as both a staff officer and as platoon leader. "The regimental intelligence officer is S-2 on the regimental staff and during tactical training and in operations is the commander of the intelligence platoon."<sup>4</sup>

After the U. S. Army General Headquarters Maneuvers of 1941, two modifications were made to the I&R platoon's table of organization and equipment. These were important because both enhanced the capability to accomplish the mission of intelligence collection and reconnaissance for the commander. It was this I&R platoon organization that accompanied the infantry regiment into WW II and the Korean War.

First, an infantry officer was assigned to lead the I&R platoon. This freed the regimental S-2 to attend to his primary staff responsibility as the commander's intelligence officer. The I & R platoon leader still received his missions and taskings from the infantry regimental commander, the S-3 and the S-2. The platoon leader served as the liaison between the regimental headquarters and oversaw the execution of tactical operations by the I&R platoon.<sup>5</sup>

The second important change to the I&R platoon's table of organization came with the mechanization of the infantry division. The I&R platoon was equipped with eight M151 1/4 ton (JEEP) vehicles: two were for the platoon headquarters and three for each of the two

reconnaissance squads. These vehicles gave the I&R platoon much greater mobility than the other infantry platoons which had to rely on either foot marches or trucks from another organization for enhanced tactical mobility.<sup>6</sup>

Under the 01 October 1942 infantry regiment TO&E 7-12, the I&R platoon was authorized vehicles that were equipped with .30 caliber machine-guns. These guns provided air defense protection to the I&R platoon when it was mounted. The squad and platoon leader's vehicles were equipped with SRC 284 radios for inter-platoon communication and with SRC 300 radios for communication between the I&R platoon headquarters and the regimental command post.<sup>7</sup>

Individual combat equipment for members of the I&R platoon included standard infantry issue and small arms for armament. Additionally, each squad had a prismatic compass or aiming circle, a 20 power single-eye telescope and/or a pair of field glasses (for observation over extended distances), and a watch.<sup>8</sup> Materials for recording the observations also included prepared range-cards, overlay paper, colored pencils, maps, photographs, and or sketches of the terrain or enemy. All members of the platoon carried notebooks and pencils for sketching and diagramming terrain and enemy positions.

All members of the I&R platoon were infantrymen. They received no additional institutional training from the Infantry School. At the time, Military Intelligence did not exist as a separate branch, so there was no military intelligence school to provide specific tactical intelligence training.<sup>9</sup> The regimental S-2 (an infantry officer) was responsible for the technical training of all I&R platoon members. The

I&R platoon leader was responsible for all collective training and the daily operations of the I&R platoon. All members of the platoon received training as scouts and observers as outlined in the personnel specialty codes of the infantry regiment's TO&E. The reconnaissance operations that were required of the I&R platoon necessarily led to very decentralized execution. Scouts from the I&R platoon often made analysis of military information for the regimental commander, from an observation or listening post miles from their platoon leader and the regimental S-2, S-3.<sup>10</sup>

Training focused on making infantrymen into scouts. This is not an easy task when one considers that infantrymen are trained to close with and destroy the enemy. A scout, on the other hand, must be trained to avoid decisive engagement with the enemy in order to observe and report in order to answer the intelligence requirements of the infantry regimental commander.<sup>11</sup> The following subjects were given training priority by doctrine:

Map and aerial photograph reading. Conventional signs, military symbols and abbreviations. Sketching. Oral and written messages and reports. Scouting and patrolling. Theory and practice of observation. Camouflage and the art of concealment. Collection of information.<sup>12</sup>

In preparation for combat, the I&R platoon was to receive additional instruction and conduct training on the pertinent information about the anticipated enemy. This included, but was not limited to, the enemy's organization, armament, equipment, tactics, designation of units, order of battle, insignia of grade and uniform, and identification of enemy aircraft and armored vehicles. Counter-intelligence training was also included as the last priority.

The 1942 version of FM 7-25 defined combat intelligence as follows:

Combat Intelligence is military intelligence produced in the field after the outbreak of the location, composition, disposition, movements, armament, equipment supply, tactics, training, discipline, and morale of the enemy forces opposing a combat unit, and the deductions made from a consideration of those factors.<sup>13</sup>

The collection of combat intelligence about the enemy, and other friendly tactical formations was the heart of daily operations for the I&R platoon of the period. They provided the human eyes and ears for the regimental commander. They went where he could not. The I&R platoon's operations were based on the principle that the commander's reconnaissance had to extend far enough to his front, flanks and rear in order to prevent the regiment from being surprised.<sup>14</sup> FM 7-25 outlined the principle functions of the I&R platoon. They included, in no particular priority, the following:

Gathering detailed information about the enemy and terrain in locations that were not readily accessible to the rifle companies and battalions of the regiment.

Assemble, evaluate and distribute information and intelligence gathered by the platoon and by subordinate, higher, and adjacent friendly units.

Provide early warning to the regiment on the presence, disposition, composition and approach of enemy forces of all types. Operate well in advance of the regiment in order to gain and maintain contact with the enemy.

Maintain contact with reconnaissance and security formations of other, larger tactical formations, (i.e.: the division reconnaissance company, and later regiment) that is operating forward or to the flanks of the regiment.<sup>15</sup>

The regimental I&R platoon was tasked to maintain contact with these formations.

Gather items of information and indications about enemy movement in order to allow the regimental commander to develop tactically sound and feasible ground military operations.

Regain lost contact with adjacent, attached and assigned friendly units. Locate and maintain contact with the flanks of an enemy force, when contact is gained by dismounted combat elements of the regiment.

Reconnoiter avenues of approach, routes, river crossings and complex enemy obstacles. Search suspicious, dominating and critical areas along the route of march to identify possible ambush sites, defended road blocks, route classification and contaminated areas.

Establish and operate 24 hour observation and listening posts.

Conduct dismounted patrolling to the front, flanks or rear of the regiment when the terrain or enemy situation precludes the use of mounted patrolling.

Assist the regimental S-2 at the command post or at a tactical observation/tactical command post by maintaining the intelligence situation map, and or keeping an intelligence log, taking and preparing reports, messages and sketches.

Carry out such counter-intelligence measures or surveillance as directed by the regimental commander or S-2. Provide instruction on the subject to other units of the regiment. Search undefended or captured towns and villages and captured enemy equipment and positions.<sup>16</sup>

Other missions performed by the regimental I&R platoon during WW II that were not prescribed by the doctrine of the period, included some of the following:

Liaison between the other infantry regiments of the division.

Messenger duties between the other infantry battalions and the regiment.

Serving as the escort and security element for the regimental commander when he went forward of the main command post.

Serving as the radio-telephone operators for the regimental command group in dismounted offensive operations.

Marking a route of march for the regiment and providing guides along the route at traffic control points (TCPs).

Accompanying a combat or reconnaissance patrol conducted by the rifle platoons or companies from the subordinate infantry battalions of the regiment in order to report on tactical progress or intelligence acquired directly to the regimental commander. Conduct economy of force operations on a flank of the regiment, in order to provide early warning and prevent the regiment from being surprised.<sup>17</sup>

While this list is not all inclusive, it does highlight the vast number of collective missions (21 total) that the I&R platoon was called upon to perform in support of the infantry regiment. It is clear from the I&R platoon's composition, equipment, manning, and mission essential task list, that it was not designed to fight for information or intelligence.

There is no evidence to suggest that the I&R platoon received any specialized military intelligence training in preparation for their deployment overseas in WW II. They were trained first, foremost and almost solely as infantrymen. Any additional specialty training came after their assignment to the infantry regiment. Regardless, they were to be trained in a wide variety of military intelligence subjects: general military intelligence operations, examining prisoners of war, map reading, and interpreting aerial photographs, counter intelligence operations, and identification of enemy armored vehicles and aircraft. This technical training was the responsibility of the Infantry Regiment's Intelligence Officer (S-2). Mostly, the training and preparation of the I&R platoon for combat in WW II was based upon its mission to support the infantry regimental commander for combat intelligence collection.

Based upon the mission, the tactical situation, and the desired end state, the I&R platoon could employ any combination of mounted and

dismounted reconnaissance techniques. The reconnaissance patrol could operate entirely mounted from the platoon's vehicles, moving at a rate of speed in order to allow for adequate visual reconnaissance enroute. Or the reconnaissance patrol could move using bounds from terrain feature to terrain feature (or bounding overwatch in today's military terminology) from one observation point to the next, then dismounting and observing at each point enroute. Finally, it could proceed mounted in its vehicles to a designated dismount point and continue the reconnaissance dismounted. Once completed the patrol could remount its vehicles and move mounted to the next point for reconnaissance.<sup>18</sup>

Whether operating mounted or dismounted, the I&R platoon always attempted to operate within mutual observation distance of individual reconnaissance patrols or observation points. "Under the most disadvantageous conditions, supporting distance should not be less than 35-50 yards."<sup>19</sup> Whether mounted or dismounted, the reconnaissance patrol primarily protected itself through aggressive yet stealthy, movement in depth. Cover, dispersion and 360 degree observation supported by a get away and link-up plan were established by doctrine, standard operating procedure and adapted for each reconnaissance patrol.<sup>20</sup> Each reconnaissance patrol was designed to make contact with the enemy or terrain objective with the smallest element possible in order to accomplish the mission. The remainder of the I&R platoon was always positioned under concealment as a minimum, ready to support any other reconnaissance patrol of the I&R platoon that might come under fire or contact. Elements of the I&R platoon not involved in the actual

reconnaissance were positioned to be able to overwatch the committed elements and support disengagement.<sup>21</sup>

Clearly there were additions made to the tables of organization of the infantry regiment's I&R platoon. Like most war-time formations, it grew in size to support its mission. Over the course of WW II, the typical infantry regiment's I&R platoon grew in size by about three to five personnel.<sup>22</sup> Some were directed military additions to the TO&E authorization. Others were local civilians or partisans that provided vital support, such as translation to the infantry regiment's human intelligence collection effort. Although the I&R platoon's official TO&E was not changed during WW II, one personal account showed that his I&R platoon grew from about twenty to thirty personnel through the course of the war.<sup>23</sup> Through the actual practice of conventional mechanized warfare during WW II, any questioned need for the infantry regimental I&R platoon appears to have been vindicated.

The Race is On:  
The Beginning of The Cold War  
1945-1960.

military thinking seemed, at the outset, to be paralyzed by its [the atomic bomb's] magnitude.<sup>24</sup>

Lieutenant General James M. Gavin

The following is a brief chronology of the key events that impacted on the I&R platoon during this period.

- 1947      U.S.A. Defense was reorganized. The Air Force was established as an equal of the other armed services.
- 1948      The Soviet Union withdrew from Korea.
- 1948      The Air Force fielded the B36A. The first intercontinental strategic bomber capable of delivering an atomic bomb overseas.



1948 The 24 June the Berlin airlift begins.

1949 The NATO is established.

1949 The Soviet Union surprises the U.S.A. by successfully testing their first atomic weapon.

1950 On 25 June, 9 Divisions of the NKPA Army (135,000), attack across the 38th parallel into South Korea.

1950 U.S. Army strength was 591,000, in 10 under strength divisions.

1950 Ranger battalions were reorganized into separate ranger companies and added to the infantry division's TO&E.

1951 FM 17-35, The Reconnaissance Battalion, was rewritten.

1952 Military Intelligence was established as its own corps.

1952 President Truman is defeated for re-election by President-Elect Eisenhower.

1953 An armistice is signed in Korea.

1953 Dwight D. Eisenhower is elected president. The U.S.A.'s new doctrine of Mass Nuclear Retaliation is adopted.

1953 The U.S. Army successfully test fires the first tactical nuclear weapon from the 280 MM atomic cannon.

1954 FM 100-5, Operations, is re-written.

1954 The Eisenhower administration initiates the New Look policy to review roles, missions, and functions of the armed services.

1955 In July, Operation GYROSCOPE tests the 101st Airborne Division's strategic mobility. They successfully deploy one RCT to Japan by air (9,000 miles) in 53 hours. They complete the entire exchange of the two RCTs by air in 11 days.

1955 Operation DESERT ROCK IV, TF Razor (3,000 soldiers), conducts a ground tactical operation after a nuclear weapon is detonated less than 1 kilometer from ground zero.

1955 The U.S. Army strength is 1.1 million.

1956 The U.S. Army initiates the PENTANA Study Phase I (5,5,5). 1956 The 101ST Airborne Division is reorganized as an PENTOMIC Division.

- 1957      The PENTANA Study Phase I is completed and Phase II is initiated. The focus is on the U.S. Army in 1960-70.
- 1957      The PENTANA Study Phase II recommends the Battle Group I&R platoon be reorganized into a special operations platoon with a scout section and a battlefield survey (EW) section.
- 1957      The FM 17-35, The Reconnaissance Battalion, is rewritten.
- 1958      The U.S. Army strength is 899,000.
- 1960      The PENTANA Study is completed. It recommends increasing the span of command and control of the company, noticeably absent a battalion C2 headquarters echelon.
- 1960      The FM 17-35, Armored Cavalry Platoon, Troop and Squadron, is rewritten.

The U.S. Army's MANHATTAN PROJECT was initiated under the Roosevelt administration in early 1939. President Roosevelt was concerned about the speed with which the United States could produce an atomic weapon. The scientific community in the United States believed that Nazi Germany had at least an 18 month lead in the development of an atomic weapon.<sup>25</sup> "It was a neck and neck race with the Germans."<sup>26</sup> The U.S. Army's TRINITY test, on 16 July 1945, in Alamogordo New Mexico, provided optimistic predictions about the successful application of an atomic weapon on the battlefield in WW II.<sup>27</sup> In an effort to bring the war in the Pacific to an end more rapidly in August of 1945, the United States used two atomic bombs against the Japanese mainland. The use of atomic weapons brought WW II to a close. The cost was 100,000 Japanese killed and over six square miles destroyed.<sup>28</sup> What was not realized at the time was the long lasting effects that atomic weapons would have on worldwide peace and stability in the years to come.

The American public cried for rapid demobilization after the Axis powers were defeated. The Truman administration was eager to turn

away from the strategic and diplomatic issues that surrounded WW II in favor of long neglected domestic problems. "Taxpayers called for reduced federal expenditures, and severe limits on military spending."<sup>29</sup> "Demobilizing the armed forces, as quickly and as equitably as possible, constituted a paramount consideration."<sup>30</sup> In September of 1945, President Truman announced plans to reduce the post WW II Army of over 8,000,000, to 1,950,000 by June of 1946.<sup>31</sup> At its peak, the United States Army had 6,100,000 soldiers serving with the ground forces, in 89 active divisions (the remainder were in the U.S. Army Air Corps).<sup>32</sup> That meant a reduction of over 6,000,000 total U.S. Army personnel in only eight months.

The Grand Alliance between the United States, the United Kingdom and The Soviet Union, had survived long enough to defeat Nazi Germany. As soon as Germany surrendered, however, diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union began to unravel. While the United States and the United Kingdom actively pursued demobilization, the Soviet Union did not.

The Red Army retained 175 mobilizable divisions after World War II, quite the largest modern military force in West as a possible tool of Soviet aggression.<sup>33</sup>

Of the 175 divisions, only one-third (50 plus) were at full strength. One-third were at partial strength, and the final one-third were cadre led divisions.<sup>34</sup> The retention of such a large military force by the Soviet Union, combined with post war tensions over the division of Germany, began to fan the smoldering coals that would later ignite the Cold War.

The United States unknowingly entered the atomic age in 1945 quite unprepared for what was to follow. "Roosevelt had been reluctant to make plans for atomic energy beyond its use in the war; his foremost concern was to make a bomb."<sup>35</sup> In 1945, the atomic bomb was the most destructive weapon that man had ever known. Bernard Brodie described the atomic bomb as the "absolute weapon and therefore compelled a total rethinking of military doctrine."<sup>36</sup> The roles, functions, and missions of all of the United States Armed Forces came into question. Bernard Brodie carried his analysis on the impact of the atomic bomb even further: "The chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on the chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose."<sup>37</sup> For the senior military leadership of the United States Army in 1945, reveling in its victory in Europe and the Pacific, this represented a 180 degree turn not only in national security strategy but also in the application of the primary ground combat arm of the services.

The United States Army was faced with a very difficult challenge. Not only did it have to demobilize two thirds of its active force in less than a year, it also had to rediscover and accredit its role on the new atomic battlefield. President Truman, on the other hand, did not share the same dichotomy in the application of the U.S.A.'s tactical and strategic forces, in his national security policy.

Having relied on the bomb once, Truman would be inclined to do so again. . . . by exploiting its menacing nature in other ways in order to shore up his position elsewhere and to compensate for apparent weaknesses in conventional forces.<sup>38</sup>

The full effects of the atomic bomb on the tactical battlefield were not yet known. The atomic bombs that were dropped on Japan were of relatively low yield; the equivalent of only 20,000 tons of TNT each.<sup>39</sup>

Nonetheless, the very existence of the bomb raised awkward questions about whether a large postwar defense establishment was, as American military planners believed, really necessary . . . mobilization potential seemed less important than capabilities in being that could absorb a future enemy attack and respond effectively.<sup>40</sup>

The United States Army planners forecasted a post-WW II ground force requirement of only 25 total divisions. "Now, with the possibility of so much destructive power in a singular weapon, a much smaller postwar force might suffice."<sup>41</sup> The United States government began to place an increasing reliance on the atomic bomb to fill the void once filled by conventional ground forces, without a complete and open minded consideration of the actual military threats posed to the post-WW II United States, as a super-power for the first time in its history.

What is implied is that tactical doctrinal developments--both nuclear and conventional--have been responsive more to political preferences held by national authorities, than to the real nature of the threat and the rigors of the nuclear battlefield.<sup>42</sup>

The United State's political and military leadership was not prepared for the role and responsibilities of a world super-power in 1945. They did not initially recognize the responsibilities associated with being the most powerful nation in the world; the title that came with winning WW II. The United State's monopoly on atomic weapons, however, secured that position for only a short time.

Only the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 had pushed the pre-war isolationist United States into WW II. The post-WW II leadership of the United States did realize that WW II would be the last war for which the United States could take the time to mobilize and prepare while other countries took the brunt of the initial fighting. "From 1914 to 1917 and 1939 to 1944, the United States was permitted to organize, train, and equip its military contribution behind the shield of allies ready for war."<sup>43</sup> In the face of an inevitable reduction in active force structure, the key to tactical military success lay in the ability to compensate for the U.S. Army's lack of active conventional forces. In 1945, the United States was to turn to its strategically unique combat multiplier; its world wide monopoly on atomic weapons.

. . . if the United States should lose the monopoly of atomic weapons it posed in 1945, the use of combatants with atomic weapons would almost certainly destroy not only America's enemies beyond rational purpose, but the United States as well.<sup>44</sup>

The United State's atomic monopoly was to be short lived. In 1945 this was not forecasted by the Truman administration. In retrospect, the use of atomic weapons by the United States threw the political and military senior leadership into a quandary.

History sired this weapon at a time when the war alliance--between the Western democracies and the Soviet Union--was beginning to crumble. It gave the Americans supreme power, of a kind, for a few years, and a false sense of security. It caused the Soviet Union to subordinate all other scientific and engineering efforts to extort the same power from nature and knowledge.<sup>45</sup>

Whether by choice or by chance, atomic weapons became the cornerstone of the United State's post-WW II political and diplomatic strategy. For the U.S. Army this meant it had to rediscover its role on

the atomic battlefield of the future. Most importantly, a new military doctrine to support that role, had to be developed.

With the U.S. holding a nuclear monopoly, he [Truman] felt there was no direct or immediate danger to the nation. Having the bomb, in other words, was Truman's backup insurance policy, one he judged he could still, implicitly if not explicitly, to influence Soviet behavior.<sup>46</sup>

"Was there any place in the nuclear age for the traditional skills of professional soldiers or for the participation of patriotic peoples? Had 'war' as it had been understood and conducted in Europe for a thousand years come to an end?"<sup>47</sup> Many in the United States thought so. With the atomic bomb as the United State's major deterrent to war, the rapid demobilization of the active military was not seen as an unacceptable risk to the nation's security.

While there were admitted American weaknesses because of demobilization, Truman could be reasonably assured that, with millions of highly trained servicemen only recently discharged, the US could respond effectively to Soviet aggression by conventional means.<sup>48</sup>

In this way, the Truman administration felt it had dealt with the two major problems that the United States faced in 1945: a conventional and atomic war with the Soviet Union and with a reduction in military spending, the ability to focus on a hearty domestic agenda.

Amidst the turbulent post war period, United States slowly began military reform in 1945. Inter-service rivalry between the army and the navy did little to speed the process. Both services feared the creation of a separate and equal arm in an air force, would be done at the expense their existing force structure.<sup>49</sup> The separation of the U. S. Army Air Corps from the U.S. Army became inevitable as early as 1946:

On June 15, 1946, Truman reaffirmed his support of a single military department and three coordinate services--an army, a navy

and an air force. . . and continuation of a separate Marine Corps with its own air support.<sup>50</sup>

This organization was formalized with the National Security Act of 1947. A civilian secretary presided over each arm of the military services who answered directly to the secretary of defense. The 1947 National Security Act created the chief of staff concept of one for each service and a single chairman of the joint staff to oversee the component chiefs of staff. The act also created the Department of Defense, the National Security Council, and the Central Intelligence Agency.<sup>51</sup> While the tactical Army was being demobilized, other organizations and echelons of command and control were actually expanding in size and function.

The only delivery means for an atomic weapon in 1947 was by dropping a bomb from an airplane. The Truman administration was quick to realize the inevitable and powerful link between the air force and the atomic bomb in relationship to national security. Technology would become a priority over conventional ground forces.

Harry S. Truman was the first to make air-atomic power the cornerstone of American defense . . . . Through both air-atomic deterrence and aid under the Truman Doctrine, President Truman hoped to prevent Communist aggression without involving Americans in combat.<sup>52</sup>

The Truman administration's heavy reliance on air-atomic power was also a reflection on "the unwillingness of the public to make either the personal or financial sacrifices necessary for the recreation of large conventional forces so soon after World War II."<sup>53</sup> The role of the conventional ground forces, that had won WW II in Europe, now stood in question. "The Navy had the advantage over the ground forces of the Army in being able to offer itself as a possible deliverer of the



bomb."<sup>54</sup> This was forecasted in the 1946 election of a Republican congress:

voters intent on a respite from the prolonged strenuousness of depression and war, determined to fulfill its constituents' wishes for tranquillity and "normalcy", and thus to recapture the White House for the GOP in 1948.<sup>55</sup>

While America had grown tired of war, its monopoly on the atomic bomb would not allow it to run away from a cold war.

The year of 1948 was a turning point for the United States and the evolution of its early atomic strategy. The United States retained its monopoly on atomic weapons through 1948. The U.S. Army had completed its rapid demobilization after WW II, and it appeared that its force structure would stabilize for the time being. "The U.S. Army would remain at 11 regular divisions (all under strength)."<sup>56</sup> The U.S. Army's role had evolved to one of the occupation of key or critical terrain in order to allow technologically advanced weaponry to defeat the enemy.

Both of the traditional services emphasized that if American military strategy was to count on the bomb to deter wars or win them if deterrence failed, there would still be a need for bases from which to launch atomic strikes. Operational aircraft of the postwar years still lacked intercontinental range. The Army would have to take and hold overseas bases; the Navy would have to carry American strength across the seas to the bases.<sup>57</sup>

Within this context, the application of U.S. Army doctrine and forces really had not changed since WW II.

The primacy of the U.S. Air Force, compared to the other armed services, was to change dramatically with the acceptance and fielding of the B36A in 1948. The B36A, along with Air Force advances in in-flight refueling, gave the United States an intercontinental bomber fleet

capable striking an enemy overseas from a base in the continental United States. The role of the postwar navy to move the army overseas in order for the army to seize and secure ground bases of operation for the air force, was once again in question.

The B36 did much to upset the postwar balance of power among the services by undercutting the Army and Navy's insistence on the value of overseas bases. So did increasingly successful experiments in mid-air refueling.<sup>58</sup>

From a western perspective the lone bright spot in the international arena in 1948 was the Soviet Union's withdrawal from the Korean peninsula. They left behind, however, a Soviet puppet regime under long-time communist Kim Il Sung. When the last American forces withdrew from the peninsula in 1949, President Syngman Rhee had established a symbolic Republic of Korea, south of the 38th parallel. Both leaders of the divided country claimed to be the only legitimate ruling power in Korea.<sup>59</sup> What appeared in 1948 as a reduction in tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States would be fueled into an unprecedented cold war standoff in a few short years.

"It . . . was the Berlin Blockade of . . . 1948, that eventually led to the incorporation of atomic bombs into American war plans."<sup>60</sup> The Berlin blockade pushed the cold war into the deep freeze. The question of whether or not to use atomic weapons again came before President Truman. Three conventional Air Force bomber groups and the only bomber group capable of delivering an atomic bomb were deployed to Europe. In early September 1948, negotiations with the Soviet Union broke down completely over the crisis in Berlin. Storage sites for atomic bombs and basing rights for bomber groups were coordinated

throughout Europe with American allies.<sup>61</sup> The Berlin blockade made official the adversarial cold war rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. It shaped and defined the first official American strategy for the use of atomic weapons: "In short, if a military confrontation could not be avoided the United States would retaliate with the most devastating response it could devise."<sup>62</sup> Because of the United State's ability to overcome the Soviet's blockade of Berlin, a school of thought was gaining ground in Washington policy and strategy circles that "increasingly regarded the atomic bomb . . . as the proven first line of defense and principle deterrent against Soviet aggression."<sup>63</sup> Postwar instability increased America's reliance on the atomic bomb supporting its primacy in our national security strategy.

The year 1949 began what some have called "A Delicate Balance of Terror."<sup>64</sup> The United State's monopoly on atomic weapons was dealt an early and nearly fatal blow.

American confidence in the Truman defense policy was somewhat shaken in August, 1949, when Soviet Russia tested a nuclear fission bomb years ahead of prediction. Though the Soviet TU-4 Bull, the longest-ranged of the Soviet bombers at the time, could not deliver an atomic bomb to the United States, it could threaten cities in Europe and Asia.<sup>65</sup>

The nuclear arms race was on. To make the situation worse, the Soviet Union was quickly developing its own fleet of intercontinental bombers. The Central Intelligence Agency reported to the National Security Council that the Soviet Union was working on the development of a hydrogen (thermo-nuclear) bomb, with many more times the explosive power of an atomic bomb.<sup>66</sup>

In a policy document titled NSC-68, the National Security Council urged Truman to order the development of an American H-bomb as soon

as possible, and to recommend to the Congress an expansion of American conventional forces. On January 30, 1950, Truman signed an executive order for the development of an H-bomb.<sup>67</sup>

The Joint Chiefs of Staff gave Secretary of Defense Johnson a revised set of completely new force structure requirements for the armed services. They envisioned a substantially enlarged force structure, with strong conventional capabilities. This included an Army of 11 divisions, at or near full strength.<sup>68</sup> The Truman administration did not to move on this recommendation very quickly. In "fact, it did little to promote the expansion of the American conventional forces until the outbreak of the Korean War, six months later."<sup>69</sup>

By 1949, the Grand Alliance of the WW II allies had dissolved. A New Western Alliance emerged on the plains of Central Europe. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established in 1949. While the Marshall Plan (announced in 1947) assisted in the economic recovery of Europe, the western European and North American governments began discussions over the necessity for the common defense of Western Europe against any aggressor:

In April, 1949, the representatives of twelve nations--the United States, Canada, Britain, France, Italy, Portugal, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway and Iceland--met in Washington, DC, in order to sign the North Atlantic Treaty.<sup>70</sup>

The treaty stated that an attack on any one of its members, was to be treated as an attack on the alliance as a whole. NATO's focus and mutual threat was to the east--the Soviet Union. After Stalin lifted the Berlin blockade in May of 1949, a partitioned West Germany was also placed under NATO protection.<sup>71</sup> For a time of "peace" an unprecedented alliance of western nations to prevent war had been established. The

polarity between the east and the west in a cold war was set in concrete.

Europe was not to be the first test of the NATO alliance. On the 25th of June 1950, nine divisions and 135,000 troops of the North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA) crossed the 38th parallel in an all out invasion of South Korea. The Republic of Korea (ROK) Army stood at only 100,000 troops and was overrun and forced to abandon the republic's capital of Seoul. This was to be the first challenge for the world police force role of the United Nations (UN).<sup>72</sup> While officially a United Nations operation, the majority of the combat forces were provided by NATO countries. North Korea's attack into South Korea challenged the American policy of containment of communism in Europe and Asia.<sup>73</sup> To retaliate against the North Korean invasion in other than atomic manner, the United States was ill-equipped to counter them with only "591,000 soldiers in ten under strength Army divisions and eleven regimental combat teams."<sup>74</sup> General MacArthur's Army of occupation held four of these divisions on the island of Japan, a little over one hundred miles away.<sup>75</sup>

What were the United States' interests in coming to the defense of South Korea? Westerners had long called Korea the Hermit Kingdom; however, its position on the Asian rim was of strategic importance. The Siberian port city of Valdivostok is only eighty miles northeast of the Korean border. One hundred and twenty-five miles to the west across the Yellow Sea lies the communist China's Shantung Peninsula. A little over one hundred miles to the east lay Japan.<sup>76</sup> The strategic location of

the Korean peninsula represented the standoff between western democracy and communism in the far east.

There was never a formal agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to divide the Korean peninsula at the 38th parallel. "Korea was divided at the 38th parallel north latitude purely on a temporary basis to facilitate the surrender of Japanese troops in that country."<sup>77</sup> North of the 38th parallel, Japanese troops were to surrender to the Soviet Union, south of it, to the United States. (See Figure 5 to view a strategic map of the far east in 1951.)

Similar to the European countries that were occupied by the Soviet Union after WW II, North Korea was transformed into an armed camp. Communist sympathizers returned to Korea from China and the Soviet Union. For three years, North Korea was tutored and trained by the Soviet Union to become a communist satellite nation.<sup>78</sup> In 1948, the Soviet Union withdrew from North Korea. They left behind a communist state which they called The People's Democratic Republic of Korea. The Soviets selected a young Korean communist who renamed himself Kim Il Sung to serve as Prime Minister.<sup>79</sup>

The Republic of (South) Korea was the only legitimate government recognized by the UN General Assembly. Its admission into the UN was denied by a Soviet veto on 8 April 1949.<sup>80</sup> Regardless, the North Koreans, supported by the Soviet Union, were seen as the unlawful aggressor by western democracies. The UN and NATO allies felt compelled to act. A conventional, not an atomic, war faced the world superpowers.

The infantry regiment of 1950, was still organized under TO&E WD 7-11 from 1944. It was basically the same as the infantry regiment

that had fought across central Europe. One addition to the infantry division force structure was approved in 1950. Organized under TO&E E7-87, dated 17 October 1950, a ranger company (airborne) was allocated to an infantry division that was organized under TO&E 7N. The ranger company's mission was "to infiltrate through enemy lines and attack command posts, artillery and tank parks and key communication centers or facilities."<sup>81</sup> Listed as one of the capabilities that this organization was: Conduct reconnaissance and intelligence operations by penetration of a hostile zone.<sup>82</sup> This contributed significantly to a division commander's intelligence collection and reconnaissance capability. Expansion of tactical force structure at a time of demobilization is normally difficult to justify. The addition of the ranger infantry company to the infantry division highlights the importance of human intelligence collection and reconnaissance during the post-WW II period.

There were no major doctrinal changes to reconnaissance organization manuals published before the Korean war began. In 1951, FM 17-35, Division Reconnaissance Battalion, was re-written. It described the operational control that could be exercised over the reconnaissance battalion as follows:

The reconnaissance battalion may operate directly under the division or under one of the major subordinate commands of the division, or companies may be attached to other elements of the division.<sup>83</sup>

This highlights a wide degree of flexibility that a division commander could exercise in the employment of his reconnaissance organization. By doctrine an infantry regimental commander could

receive additional support for his reconnaissance and security needs from the division reconnaissance battalion.

By 1952, Harry S. Truman was the least popular president since Andrew Johnson. His administration was accused of internal corruption. He was personally chastised for being "soft" on communism and for the fact that the Korean "Police Action" had become a bloody stalemate, while unsuccessful negotiations dragged on at Pammunjom.<sup>84</sup> Truman's chances for a reelection were bleak.

Aside from discrediting President Truman personally, the Korean War also caused profound changes in the post-WW II views on United States' foreign, security, and defense policies. The United States led UN coalition had been at war with North Korea and The Peoples Republic of China--both believed to be puppets of the Soviet Union--only heightened anxiety about the "Red Menace" among the American populace.

But Truman's inability to bring the war to a satisfactory conclusion--the continuing sacrifice of American soldiers for no clear purpose--convinced many people that relying on conventional military means to stop communist expansion was folly. The vicious character of the fighting--with outnumbered American infantrymen battling "Asian hordes" at close quarters--seemed to play to their advantages. Many Americans considered it absurd that this situation stemmed from our refusal to use precisely those weapons that advanced technology had provided us. Americans wanted policies that would check communism more effectively than had Truman (who in addition to his troubles over Korea also was blamed for losing China. But they wanted to achieve that end by capitalizing on American strengths, particularly technology, rather than squandering American manpower. Above all, they wanted no more Koreas.<sup>85</sup>

As the pace of escalation of the Korean War eased, the allure of air power built around the decisive power of the atomic bomb reasserted itself. Though not aware of it at the time Truman was sealing America's commitment--and that of its NATO allies, by their



willingness to defer to American leadership--to a defense posture dependent on strategic air and nuclear weapons. After 1953, the United States Air Force would operate in the forefront of Department of Defense planning and spending for the next generation. The United States' most junior service component would provide the majority of the combat power for both strategic deterrence and wining conventional war.<sup>86</sup>

The Korean War experience suggested that in order to deter less than a general communist atomic attack, conventional ground forces needed to be expanded in size and readiness. The Truman administration continued to view Western Europe as the most vital of America's interests and the theater of greatest threat to national security. Initial estimates called for a total of 90 divisions to support the defense of Europe, one-half on active duty by the end of 1953.<sup>87</sup> Truman sought to work out the details of the 1949 NATO agreement and develop an increased reliance on allies for the defense of Western Europe. Truman secured an agreement in principle from all NATO allies, to appoint an American as the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO forces in Europe. He then brought General Eisenhower from the presidency of Columbia University back to active duty to fill that post.

By the time the armistice was signed between North and South Korea in 1953, the U.S. Air Force had expanded from 400,00 airmen and 7,500 planes to 800,000 airmen and 14,000 aircraft. The U.S. Army had also grown to 1,533,000 soldiers and twenty full strength divisions.<sup>88</sup>

The NKPA-CPA had concentrated a total of 1.5 million soldiers on the Korean peninsula against the UN. Though the Soviet Union furnished much of the arms and equipment used by the Chinese and the

North Koreans during the war, for the most part, the aid came in the form of conventional infantry small arms.<sup>89</sup> While the threat of retaliation with atomic weapons did not loom over the battlefields of Korea, soon it would hover over the cold war battlefields of Western Europe. "The Soviets achieved their first thermo-nuclear explosion in August 1953."<sup>90</sup> The U.S.A. would soon lose their monopoly over atomic weapons. It was time to re-think the U.S.A.'s strategic atomic policies and doctrine.

When Harry S. Truman left the Oval Office in January 1953, nuclear weapons were America's first line of defense. This dependence on nuclear weapons was not intended and was not a foregone conclusion with the coming of the cold war or the nuclear age. Rather, it was the logical outcome of Truman's policies and practices since the first nuclear explosion in the summer of 1945.<sup>91</sup>

Even without its use in the Korean War, the atomic bomb had snowballed to predominance in America's national security strategy by 1953.

The 1950 Infantry Regiment that fought in the Korean War, reflected the changes to the organizational structure that were adopted during and after WW II. (See Figure 6 for a line diagram of the infantry regiment's organization in 1950.) The infantry regiment retained the three infantry battalions, a headquarters, and headquarters company and a service company. It dropped the anti-tank company and replaced it with a tank company. It added a mortar company and expanded the medical detachment into a medical company. (See Figure 7 for a line diagram of the Infantry regiment's headquarters company in 1950.)

The 1950 FM 7-40, Infantry Regiment, expanded the sources that were available for the commander to employ, or request support from, in order to answer his intelligence collection and reconnaissance needs.

The reconnaissance agencies which normally contribute information to the regiment during tactical movements include aviation, corps and division reconnaissance units, light aircraft and the regimental intelligence and reconnaissance platoon.<sup>92</sup>

Reconnaissance in the same chapter of FM 7-40, dated 1942, did not address intelligence collection and reconnaissance from sources outside the infantry regiment. It addressed the support provided by the I&R platoon and the commander's role in a leader's reconnaissance.<sup>93</sup> The comparison of doctrine recognizes the importance of reconnaissance sources available at each tactical echelon, and yet it emphasizes the need to pass the intelligence up and down the chain of command. More importantly, the comparison reflects a new flexibility in the application and distribution of intelligence collection and reconnaissance assets within the division. (See Figure 7 for a line diagram of the infantry regiment's headquarters company in 1950.)

The I&R platoon remained assigned to the infantry regiment's headquarters and headquarters company.

The organization of the I&R platoon during the Korean War was identical to the one that fought in the WW II. It consisted of a platoon headquarters and three reconnaissance squads. (See Figure 8 for a line diagram of the I&R platoon in 1950.)

The organization and duties of the I&R platoon in 1950, were not significantly different from those outlined in 1942.<sup>94</sup> The mission of the 1950 I&R platoon was to:

obtain information by reconnaissance and observation. It maintains contact with the enemy and with friendly reconnaissance and security units. The regimental S-2 supervises its use.<sup>95</sup>

The only significant difference between the 1942 and 1950 I&R platoon missions was that counter-intelligence operations were dropped from the 1950 mission statement.<sup>96</sup>

In 1950, the I&R platoon was the infantry regiment's primary combat intelligence source. It collected information under the regimental S-2's supervision as the regimental commander directs. It operated under the platoon leader's immediate control. It could be assigned any of the following missions:

- a. Preceding the advance guard during marches.
- b. Providing connecting groups for the regiment on the march, when its squads are not needed for intelligence, reconnaissance, or observation missions.
- c. Obtaining enemy and terrain information in areas and situations requiring trained intelligence personnel.
- d. Locating and maintaining contact with the enemy when the regiment is not protected by covering forces.
- e. Investigating areas for enemy information.
- f. Maintaining contact with element of the division reconnaissance company, and other covering forces operating to the front or the flanks.
- g. Establishing and maintaining contact with adjacent friendly units.
- h. Establishing and occupying observation posts.
- i. Providing trained intelligence and reconnaissance personnel to accompany patrols of other units.<sup>97</sup>

The missions described in the 1950 FM 7-25 for the I&R platoon as compared to the missions as described in the earlier 1942 version of FM 7-25, very nearly mirror each other. They also match first hand accounts of what I&R platoons practiced in WW II.<sup>98</sup>

Combat Operations With An I&R Platoon In The Korean War:12

August Through 01 September 1951.<sup>99</sup> Dr. Jack J. Gifford served from August to September 1951, as a Private First Class in the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon of the 21st Infantry Regiment, assigned to the 24th Infantry Division in South Korea. He was assigned as an Assistant Browning Automatic Rifleman with the I&R platoon from 12 August - 1 September 1951.<sup>100</sup> While a period of rather brief service, his personal recollections into Korean War I&R platoon operations, provide a valuable first hand comparison and contrast to I&R platoon combat operations in WW II.

The I&R platoon in WW II was organized with three reconnaissance squads. The I&R platoon of the 21st Infantry Regiment during Dr. Gifford's assignment, had an additional reconnaissance squad for a total of four 12 man squads. He did not recall his platoon having an officer assigned as the platoon leader. He believed that his platoon sergeant worked directly for the infantry regiment's intelligence officer. His best estimate of personnel strengths included 13 non-commissioned officers and approximately 35 enlisted men. The platoon was manned at well over 100% of TO&E authorizations. Noticeably absent however were any interpreters or Korean linguists to serve as interrogators or translators of captured personnel. This would severely hamper the platoon's capability to perform reconnaissance. How could they get information from civilians, refugees or prisoners of war? Linguists were accepted as TO&E overages in WW II I&R platoons.<sup>101</sup>

The equipment assigned to Dr. Gifford's I&R platoon was largely the same assigned to the I&R platoon of WW II. Each squad and the

platoon headquarters had a pair of binoculars, for a total of five in the platoon. Each squad and the platoon headquarters also had a man-packed radio for internal communication. Dr. Gifford's I&R platoon had only one 1/4 ton JEEP for transport. It had only one .50 caliber machine-gun for air defense. He expected that the regimental headquarters had probably reassigned or tasked their other vehicles for liaison duties. This was acceptable because unlike the I&R platoon of WW II they performed almost all of their operations on foot.<sup>102</sup>

According to Dr. Gifford, he received no additional or specialty training to prepare him for his specific duties and responsibilities as a scout or observer in the I&R platoon. In fact because of his undergraduate education and an additional year and a half of graduate education at his time of enlistment, he was initially assigned to the infantry regiment's adjutant general's (S-1) section before he was sent to the I&R platoon. Any training that he received in intelligence collection and reconnaissance was done after his assignment to the I&R platoon. The reconnaissance training was mostly on-the-job, or practiced and rehearsed while providing security for the infantry regimental command post and during the conduct of directed combat missions.<sup>103</sup>

Combat Operations were built upon basic infantry daylight patrolling. Normally the entire platoon would participate in these operations. They conducted almost no mounted or motorized reconnaissance--almost always on foot. The terrain would restrict the I&R platoon to the very few roads that would put it at an undue risk. What is most interesting in the conduct of operations by this infantry

regiment's I&R platoon was the area of operations it was assigned: behind the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). Dr. Gifford stated that the regiment normally defended with two battalions up on the FEBA and one regiment in depth or in reserve. Their area of intelligence collection and reconnaissance operations was behind the two forward battalions along the FEBA and forward of the battalion in depth or reserve.

All [I&R platoon operations were conducted] behind our lines, in areas between the front lines and the reserve [battalion]. . . we were between the two . . . [the] civilians had all been cleared out, . . . we still looked for enemy infiltrators and stragglers, . . . we had to recon where our [regiment's] troops did not occupy [the terrain in the infantry regiment's defensive sector].<sup>104</sup>

Other tactical missions that were performed were similar to those the I&R platoon of WW II conducted. These included lateral liaison between other regiments and escort for the regimental commander. In Dr. Gifford's brief experience in his regiment's I&R platoon, he participated in no area or route reconnaissance. He did not recall establishing any observation posts or traffic control points (TCPs) that were directed by the regimental commander, the S-2 or in support of a regimental movement. They did not provide escort or liaison for other units within the regiment's area of operation. Most often the I&R platoon provided details and support to the regimental command post.<sup>105</sup>

"We set up tents and provided security for the regimental command post at night. A lot of (enemy) infiltrators got through [the FEBA]. We might do reconnaissance by day, but at night they [regimental headquarters], wanted us back [at the regimental command post], for security."<sup>106</sup>

Doctrine Versus Combat Operations in Korea: 1951

The platoon sergeant said, if we did what was in the book, we'd all get killed!<sup>107</sup>

Dr. Gifford describes the differences between the battlefields of the two previous world wars and the Korean War in relationship to the defensive stalemate of the Korean War:

Remember, it was World War One, not World War Two we were doing. The lines were solid, you didn't need to scout out [to find the enemy or his positions], the guys were right over there on that hill . . . you did not have to send a scout out, (pause), you KNEW they were over there. They'd been out there for weeks, . . . you didn't need to send a patrol out there to find that out, (pause), you KNEW!<sup>108</sup>

Because it was largely not a war of maneuver after 1951, there was not the WW II concern for exposed flanks and tying in units. Dr. Gifford further described the defensive, trench war stalemate of the Korean War by 1951. The defensive positions: ". . . were linked. I could talk to the position of another company on my left [or right], . . . we could shout at each other."<sup>109</sup> Dr. Gifford stated that most often he could see the next fighting position, and the soldiers personally did the necessary tactical coordination to ensure a coordinated defense between the two units.<sup>110</sup>

This type of positional, defensive warfare probably did not require the support of another organization from the regimental headquarters in order to be successful. The frequency and nature of both the NKPA, and CPA attacks were rather predictable. Again, Dr. Gifford's personal recollection of the enemy's offensive operations:

Normally the sequence was very well set, . . . he [the North Koreans and/or Communist Chinese], will not organize for the attack until after dark, . . . normally two - three hours after it got dark, this is likely when the attack would come in. Sometimes you



could hear them getting organized before their assault. Because their communication was so poor below the regimental level, sometimes you could hear horns, whistles and shouting before an attack, in order to get them organized. It's [the enemy's attack], going to be a narrowly concentrated assault, normally on a fairly narrow front, and going to come in usually without a whole lot of [indirect or direct fire] preparation. You may get a very intense, brief mortar, [and] artillery barrage. So, yea, it [was] fairly predictable.<sup>111</sup>

The defensive nature of the Korean War by late 1951 limited the scope of tactical offensive operations. Small offensive operations were fought emerging from defensive trenches only briefly and then the infantry quickly slipped back into them. The war was fought from these trenches over very restrictive terrain by rifle platoons, companys and battalions. The infantry regiment served mainly to resource these subordinate formations.<sup>112</sup>

The terrain of Korea was very difficult [rugged,] and it limited our freedom to maneuver. [This and the political pressure] . . . not to upset the peace talks limited the scope and nature of our offensive operations, [and eventually led to] . . . the solid lines of entrenchment, this [relegated] the I&R platoon to use as a standard infantry rifle platoon, in the support and security of the infantry regiment's command post.<sup>113</sup>

On the battlefield, Korea had proven to be very different from WW II. The effects of restrictive terrain, the unsophisticated nature of the enemy and the threat of mass destruction with nuclear weapons had already become to affect the U.S. Army's conventional tactics and force structure design. Although not initially recognized as significant, the departure from the historical and doctrinal employment of the I&R platoon telegraphed the changing role of the entire conventional U.S. Army ground force over the next ten years.

President Eisenhower took office in January in 1953 on the pledge to bring the war in Korea to a swift close, "and to avoid similar

wars in the future."<sup>114</sup> It was the latter half of his campaign pledge that came to shape the Eisenhower administration's national security strategy.

The first year of Eisenhower's presidency was preoccupied with bringing the Korean war to an end, and outlining the initial stages of demobilization of American forces in South Korea. A total of six regular army, two national guard, and two Marine divisions, (one in Korea and one in reserve in Japan), served as the core of the UN forces in Korea. Three and later only two U.S. Army divisions remained on the peninsula. The defense of South Korea was to rely on the 550,000 troops of the ROK Army.<sup>115</sup>

1954: The "NEW LOOK". Many in the Eisenhower administration embraced a new national security strategy based on deterrence. While the conventional ground forces had not achieved a decisive victory on the Korean peninsula, many believed that;

. . . the threat to use atomic weapons in Korea, the message being conveyed to the Chinese through India was decisive; this conviction was important in conditioning subsequent policy.<sup>116</sup>

This new national security strategy was made official early in 1954 when Eisenhower's Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced:

. . . the United States was prepared to retaliate massively for local aggression as well as large implying a readiness to use tactical nuclear weapons against Korean--like attacks. U.S. forces defending Western Europe would also be equipped with tactical nuclear weapons, supposedly to offset superior numbers of Soviet conventional forces.<sup>117</sup>

From this announcement the Eisenhower administration's national security strategy of mass retaliation was born. At the heart of this strategy was an even greater reliance on nuclear weapons. Secretary of State

Dulles publicly described the United State's strategy as "a great capacity to retaliate instantly by means and at places of our choosing."<sup>118</sup>

There was more to Eisenhower's national security strategy than just bombing an enemy into the stone age. A document known as NSC 162/2 was drafted in the very early months of the Eisenhower presidency. Entitled Basic National Security Policy, it was approved by the National Security Council on 29 October 1953. It was to serve as the keystone of America's national security strategy throughout the eight years of the Eisenhower administration.<sup>119</sup>

An important theme throughout NSC 162/2 was the link between security and a healthy economy. Economic recession in the United States would seriously jeopardize the security of the free world. Conversely, a strong American economy with steady growth would enable the country to support a strong defense for an extended period of time.<sup>120</sup>

According to standard Republican thinking of the day, the Federal Government best could encourage growth and maintain a strong dollar by putting a clamp on federal spending. Since defense outlays formed the largest part of the Federal budget, Republicans saw an inverse relationship between defense spending and economic well being. Spending too much on defense was self defeating. In other words, NSC 162/2 implied that frugality in defense spending was needed to sustain the economy, thereby benefiting the country's over all strength.<sup>121</sup>

The Eisenhower administration sought military capabilities that could counter the threats posed by the much larger and soon to be nuclear equipped Soviet Union and as cheaply as possible. This explains the prominence of nuclear weapons in NC 162/2:

American military policy will rest on a capability of inflicting massive retaliatory damage by offensive striking power. . . .

Consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions in the event of war.<sup>122</sup>

The Eisenhower administration believed that the national security policy outlined in NSC 162/2, with its stated willingness to use nuclear weapons, would serve as a deterrent for their ultimate employment. The threat of using nuclear weapons, combined with the recent memory of the devastating effects they could have, would intimidate would be aggressors and maintain world order, at a more reasonable cost than large standing conventional forces.<sup>123</sup>

Noticeably absent from NSC 162/2 was a plan for the employment of nuclear weapons; why, when, and how would the United States retaliate? Without any attempt to describe how to use nuclear weapons in support of American National Security Strategy, the title of "Mass Retaliation", was really based on the principle of deterrence.<sup>124</sup> This fundamentally changed the role of the American conventional military forces. Where formally its role was to fight the nation's wars and win them, its roles had turned 180 degrees--their purpose was to deter them.<sup>125</sup> Decisive victory would be achieved through the use of nuclear weapons, as outlined in early 1954, with the release of a defense study entitled "New Look."

The "New Look", as it was called, reflected above all the commonly held belief that nuclear weapons had revolutionized warfare . . . The "New Look" redefined the role of each Service, aligning it with the requirements of an atomic age. . . . Eisenhower and his advisors believed that air power was the key to deterrence. Thus the Air Force, less than a decade after achieving independent status, was exalted to primacy among the Service(s).<sup>126</sup>

In essence, the results of the "New Look" study substituted nuclear firepower for conventional ground forces and manpower in the United States Armed Forces. Charles Wilson, Eisenhower's first

Secretary of Defense introduced a programmed transition to a heavy reliance on an atomic armory ranging all the way from thermonuclear bombs to the smallest artillery shell which could be with (an) atomic explosive, [and] . . . (in Wilson's own words), the United States would have more "bang for the buck", and could afford to reduce its numbers in uniform.<sup>127</sup> The intimidating fireball and the mushroom cloud that billowed skyward from the blast of the first atomic explosion in 1945 continued to overpower the United States leadership almost a decade later. The role of the conventional U.S. Army ground forces were at a loss for their roles, missions and functions.

1953-1955: The Impact of The "New Look". "The immediate effect of the "New Look," then, was to reduce the resources available to the Army for fighting a land war."<sup>128</sup> This was a trend that was to continue throughout the Eisenhower administration. In 1955 U.S. Army strength stood at 1.1 million. . At the end of 1958 it reached 899,000. And in 1961 it hit bottom at 859,000 in fourteen divisions.<sup>129</sup> An officer of the period described the role of the U.S. Army as follows; "the Army had become an 'an auxiliary service,' apparently retained for ceremonial purposes while the Air Force girds its loins to fight our wars."<sup>130</sup> Many people out-side the U.S. Army believed that it had become obsolete. This opinion was held at the highest levels in the United States government and in some sectors of the U.S. Army:

Obviously, the NSC envisioned only a limited role for the Army in such a nuclear war. Yet the Army doubted whether conditions following a massive nuclear attack would permit it to carry out even a simple occupation mission effectively.<sup>131</sup>

The U.S. Army's concerns with the new atomic doctrine were forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 21 December 1953.

The Army, in this paper, came close to rejecting nuclear weapons altogether, a proposal that must have seemed quixotic to administration officials who viewed nuclear weapons as a panacea. Specifically the Army argued for the following: The prohibition, or minimum use, of weapons of mass destruction. The restriction of attacks by weapons of mass destruction, if used, to selected tactical targets which would cause minimum human loss and material loss and promote the achievement of military objectives by conventional forces.<sup>132</sup>

Then Chief of Staff of the Army General Matthew B. Ridgeway stated: "that the [Eisenhower] administration had become enamored with theory-- the unproven hypothesis that the threat of nuclear retaliation would prevent aggression."<sup>133</sup>

The U.S. Army senior leadership wanted an integrated nuclear capability for all operations. Achieving such a capability would require much smaller and very accurate tactical nuclear weapons.<sup>134</sup> "As never before, the Army focused on a simple factor--technology--as the principle determinant of how wars would be fought."<sup>135</sup> The U.S. Army sought a way to harness--limit--the destructive effects of nuclear weapons, in order to compliment their conventional capabilities on the battlefield.

The first tactical artillery piece to fire a nuclear round successfully came from the 280 MM atomic cannon in May of 1953. Its range was only 17 miles and its mobility was limited to improved roads. While it became obsolete before it was ever fielded, it proved that the U.S. Army could deliver tactical nuclear weapons in the surface to surface role. Even so, it was impressive as a technological breakthrough as a tactical atomic delivery system. The U.S. Army's tactical

commanders needed a weapon that provided the firepower of an atomic weapon, but that was still light enough for cross country mobility at a speed that could keep up with maneuver and had the range to reach deep into an enemy's rear. The U.S. Army began developing nuclear ammunition for its existing family of tactical artillery; the 203MM and 155MM howitzers. Designed as only an interim solution, the U.S. Army acknowledged the undesirable limitations in the range these systems offered.<sup>136</sup>

Simultaneously the U.S. Army pursued an ambitious tactical surface to surface missile testing program from 1953 to 1955. It included the Honest John missile with a 22 mile range, the NIKE Ajax missile with a 25 mile range, the Corporal with a 75 mile range, and finally the Redstone, with a range up to 240 miles.<sup>137</sup> The U.S. Army was set on challenging the supremacy of the U.S. Air Force in technology.

Technology in and of itself was not the sole answer. The need for speed in fielding a tactical ground atomic force outweighed the desire for an immediate resurgence in the decisive superiority of ground forces. While the U.S. Army actively sought its role on the new atomic battlefield, the senior U.S. Army leadership openly stated that: "the critical gap in US defense capability lay in the shortage of forces able to defeat such non-nuclear aggression."<sup>138</sup> For all his efforts, General Gavin was not able to sway the Joint Chiefs to the U.S. Army's way of thinking. In 1946, the Joint Staff's initial draft of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan stated that, "in a general war, regardless of the manner of initiation, atomic weapons will be used from the

onset."<sup>139</sup> General Ridgeway continued his criticism of the new national security policy:

American military forces as inadequate in strength and improperly proportioned. The nation's foremost need was for an immediately available mobile joint military force of hard-hitting character, in which the versatility of the whole is emphasized and the preponderance of any one part is de-emphasized.<sup>140</sup>

While the U.S. Army would reorganize its tactical force structure, it was not able to expand its force structure.

A New U.S. Army Doctrine. In 1954 FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations, was rewritten for the first time since WW II. (This edition would not be superseded until 1958.) This keystone of U.S. Army war fighting doctrine addressed atomic weapons in relation to the tactical ground force commander for the first time. It supported the reliance of the U.S. Army on firepower:

Atomic weapons provide a commander with the most powerful destructive force yet known to influence operations. The proper integration of atomic firepower and the maneuver of the force is of the utmost importance. The commander may consider atomic fires as additional firepower of large magnitude to compliment other available fire support for maneuvering forces, or he may fit his maneuver plan to the use of atomic fires.<sup>141</sup>

The later half of this quotation acknowledges that atomic weapons would drive the development of ground maneuver plans. Perhaps this is part of the U.S. Army's heritage:

Consistent with this preference for machines over--men was the Army's perennial position in the debate on whether maneuver or firepower provided the decisive ingredient in land combat. In practice (though not always in published doctrine), the Army traditionally had come down in favor of fire power.<sup>142</sup>

Faced with questions about how to maneuver on, through and around an atomic battlefield, the U.S. Army attempted to apply itself to all the



battlefield conditions of an early and still unproven atomic and non-atomic doctrine.

FM 100-5 also addressed defensive measures against atomic weapons. This was especially important to the infantry because the execution of their mission left them dangerously exposed to the effects of an atomic explosion. The best defense against an atomic weapon was to detect them and then destroy them before they could strike you. The second best measure "included dispersion consistent with efficient conduct of operations."<sup>143</sup> The principle of battlefield dispersion was to become the counter to the massed firepower effects of tactical atomic weapons. FM 100-5 continued:

The commander considering defensive measures against mass destruction weapons must decide the balance required between dispersion and control. . . . Particular emphasis should be placed on the dispersion of the reserve.<sup>144</sup>

"Rather than massing in expectation of an enemy attack, American forces would disperse both laterally and in depth."<sup>145</sup> Dispersion, flexibility, and mobility became the framework around which the U.S. Army would design their doctrine, organizations, tactics techniques and procedures in the years following Korea. The three principles were not new.

While they were "cherished for their simplicity; . . . in the end they obscured as much as they enlightened, . . . moving from the abstract to the concrete would prove much more elusive."<sup>146</sup> While the Korean War was not a decisive victory for the UN, it did preserve the role of the infantry on the non-atomic battlefield. The Commandant of the U.S. Army Infantry School published a White Paper in July of 1955,

entitled The Role Of The Infantry. It was intended to define and reinforce the conventional need and role of the infantry:

The belief, current in some circles, that air power could take care any situation was completely shattered in Korea by a stubborn peasant infantry that had never read the writings of Douhet, Mitchell, Seversky, and other advocates of air power. Not until adequate forces were placed on the ground to oppose them in their own element could this peasant infantry be stopped or even slowed appreciably. "Korea illustrated the fact that a determined enemy can move on the ground and launch powerful attacks in spite of a completely dominant hostile air power." General Charles L. Bolte.<sup>147</sup>

True, infantry supported by tremendous air power had turned the tide in Korea, but it was not a decisive victory. And, atomic weapons were not used. The dilemma between dispersion in order to reduce the target signature of the infantry regiment and the need to mass the infantry regiment for decisive offensive operations or successful defenses would drive the U.S. Army into a division reorganization study by 1956. First the U.S. Army needed to test its conventional forces on a dirty atomic battlefield. U.S. Army leaders in the early 1950's conceived the notion that a few well placed tactical nuclear weapons would accomplish what millions of shells fired in WW II had. Armed with this faith in the accuracy and lethality of tactical nuclear weapons, the only question was the technical one of learning how to pass exploitation forces through an area scorched by nuclear fires and radioactive fallout.<sup>148</sup>

In 1955 the U.S. Army conducted a series of tactical exercises and nuclear tests designed to test the concept of tactical ground maneuver on a battlefield with live atomic explosions. The most important was an operation called DESERT ROCK VI conducted at Yucca

Flat, Nevada. It included a composite armored force, Task Force RAZOR, positioned only 3,000 meters from a 30--kiloton (the equivalent of 30,000 tons of TNT) atomic weapon.<sup>149</sup>

When the device was detonated a choking dust and terrifying flash of light instantly filled the vehicles nearest to ground zero. But neither vehicles nor crews appeared to suffer any adverse effects. Within a half--minute Task Force Razor had opened fire with its tank cannon and machine guns. Within three minutes communication had been established. And eight minutes after the blast, Task Force Razor was advancing toward its objective, skirting within 900 meters of ground zero, even as a mushroom cloud billowed 40,000 feet above the desert floor.<sup>150</sup>

The U.S. Army used exercises like DESERT ROCK VI to convince outsiders of the compatibility of ground forces and nuclear weapons. They became part of the largest reorganization study of the U.S. Army since the Louisiana and Carolina Maneuvers in 1941. They began in earnest in 1956.<sup>151</sup>

The PENTANA Study. Part One. General Maxwell D. Taylor, as the Chief of Staff of the U S Army, was responsible for directing the reorganization study for the division structure.

I visualize that the atomic battlefield of the future will have much greater breadth and depth than the battlefields of the past. There will probably be a checkerboard disposition of units with considerable gaps between combat elements. Consequently, all Army units must be trained in all around combat in the same way that we trained and fought our airborne divisions in WW II.<sup>152</sup>

The importance of reducing battlefield density in order to improve survivability against nuclear fires imposed the greatest influence over the U.S. Army's reorganization efforts. Dispersion within the division meant that subordinate units would fight with greater autonomy; separated and in a non-linear fashion. In the fluid and deep battle that was envisioned by military theorists of the time,

tactical combat formations would have to be self contained, robust and self sustaining.<sup>153</sup> General Leslie R. Groves forecasted this concept as early as 1950:

I do not see how large armies can be supported in combat. I anticipate the use of widely dispersed small forces--combat team size and even smaller--their equipment light--their supplies limited--not only air supported but probably air transported and air supplied.<sup>154</sup>

The most widely held concept of employment for conventional forces supported by tactical nuclear weapons was:

to use a river line as the area to in which to exploit their destructive effect. A mobile covering force would delay the enemy's advance, while an observation force, well protected against atomic attack, would be deployed overlooking the river, with a mobile armored striking force assembled further to the rear. Nuclear weapons would be used to strike at the concentration of enemy troops as they assembled to cross, on their crossing places, and on any bridgeheads that, in spite of this, they might have established on the near side. The armored striking forces would then attack and eliminate the remnants.<sup>155</sup>

Another alternative for the employment of conventional forces equipped with tactical nuclear weapons to support NATO and the defense of Western Europe was:

to disperse the defending forces in a series of well protected static positions in depth, each equipped with its own tactical nuclear delivery system, with which it would strike the enemy forces that penetrated into the empty areas between the positions, the coup de grace against the remnants being delivered by airborne forces.<sup>156</sup>

In the mid 1950's, dispersion was thought to be the primary solution to survival on the nuclear battlefield. The infantry regiment of WW II and Korea did not appear to possess those qualities. It appeared too cumbersome and relied on too many external units for support and sustainment. Reinforcing the existing infantry regiment

with artillery, engineers, signal and logistics created an expanded Regimental Combat Team (RCT), approach to task organizing for combat. The concern of the military theorists of the period, suggested that a regiment that was task organized in that way would lack the quickness and flexibility envisioned as a requirement for future tactical formations. The fear was that an infantry regiment task organized in this fashion, would become a very lucrative nuclear target--violating the overriding need for tactical dispersion.<sup>157</sup>

"The problem, according to General Gavin, was to dissolve the [existing] organization down to the size of units you are not afraid of losing to one [nuclear] blast."<sup>158</sup> It is interesting to note that the criteria for the reorganization or development of a new tactical military formation was based on surviving a nuclear attack by the enemy instead of what the formation needed to fight and win. Such an approach appears to have rendered the decisiveness and initiative away from the tactical fighting formations.

To General Gavin and others, the echelon that was expendable in the reorganization was the battalion. The U.S. Army developed a new building block for the division. With the battalion removed as a command and control echelon, the company was left to be controlled directly by the regiment. This new organization was named the battle group. The battle group was not as large as the Korean war RCT, but it became a very large battalion.<sup>159</sup> (See Figure 9 for a diagram of the proposed reorganization of the PENTOMIC division in 1956.)

The battle group's design was to be more flexible and sustainable. Unlike the triangular division that was built around the

number three, the PENTANA organization was built on the number five; hence the term 'PENTANA Study' and the experimental PENTOMIC division. Each division was to have five battle groups. Each battle group was to have five companies of five platoons each. Support for the battle group came from the permanent assignment of combat service support assets. Each battle group retained a headquarters and service company that included reconnaissance, signal, maintenance and medical support. Unique to the battle group design was the replacement of the direct support artillery with a heavy (105MM) mortar battery. Artillery became a divisional asset, although each battle group enjoyed an habitual supporting relationship with a 105MM artillery battery.<sup>160</sup>

The concept behind this very different divisional force structure was that "with a greater number of units at his disposal a [battle group] commander would have more options for deploying his forces in depth or for disposing of them to fight on a 'non-linear' battlefield."<sup>161</sup> The infantry division was also to have its own tactical nuclear weapon.

The 101st Airborne Division was converted to the PENTOMIC configuration in the fall of 1956. The airborne division served as the prototype for the new PENTOMIC division.

To be sure, with its battle groups and support elements fully air transportable, the airborne division alone met the Army staff's criterion for strategic mobility. But in doing so it sacrificed tanks, armored personnel carriers and cannon artillery greater than 105MM. At the upper end of the scale, the new [PENTOMIC] division compensated for this lack of heavy weapons with the Honest John rockets for nuclear fire support and un-armored 90MM and 106MM antitank weapons. At the scales lower end was a substantial increase in crew served weapons such as mortars and machine guns. The number of helicopters increased from 10 - 37, an attempt to offset a reduction in wheeled vehicles. The total number of

assigned soldiers dropped from slightly more than 17,000 . . . to 11,486.<sup>162</sup>

Doctrine and Tactics For Two Different Battlefields. The U.S. Army saw classic flanking maneuvers a thing of the past, because of the non-linear nature of the nuclear battlefield, and vast distances between forces.

Henceforth, penetration would become the predominant mode of attack. . . . the "frontal assault" was the most direct route to the enemy's vitals, would henceforth become the cheapest route after atomic weapons open the way.<sup>163</sup>

Nuclear fires were to break through the enemies defenses--penetrate--so that the maneuver units could perform the "technical tasks and finishing touches of the attack as they rolled unimpeded into the enemy's rear."<sup>164</sup> (A reminder of WW I tactics and the U.S. Army's expectations of firepower.)

Part one of the PENTANA Study was completed in late 1956. Part Two was initiated in 1957 with a view toward the divisional structure for 1960-1970.<sup>165</sup> A TO&E, doctrine, tactics and techniques were finally published for the PENTOMIC battle group by 1959. (See Figure 9 for a line diagram of infantry battle group in 1959.)

The infantry battle group retained a reconnaissance platoon. Its mission had been expanded to include security force operations such as screening and a more centralized approach to the execution of operations.

The reconnaissance platoon performs reconnaissance and provides security for the battle group. It is organized to be employed generally as a unit. It may engage in limited offensive and defensive, and delaying actions in the performance of its missions.

a. Patrol or screen a flank.

- b. Maintain contact between elements of the battle group or with adjacent units.
- c. Reconnoiter areas or routes, to include checking for CBR contamination.
- d. Maintain contact with a withdrawing enemy force.
- e. Establish OP's.<sup>166</sup>

The infantry battle group's reconnaissance platoon force structure had changed considerably along with its mission. (See Figure 11 for a line diagram of the infantry battle group reconnaissance platoon organization in 1959.) The primary mission of the reconnaissance platoon was to reconnoiter and provide security for a company, the battle group, or the units to which it was assigned or attached.<sup>167</sup> The capabilities of the reconnaissance platoon included the following types of missions:

- a. Surveillance.
- b. Collecting and reporting information of an intelligence nature.
- c. Providing flank protection for a moving or a stationary unit.
- d. Providing security or maintaining contact between elements of the battle group or between the battle group and adjacent units.
- e. Screening the main body of the battle group or subordinate elements.
- f. Securing rear areas, lines of communication, and installations by establishing a warning system against enemy airborne or guerrilla forces.
- g. Maintaining combat liaison with units on the flanks or to the front of the battle group.
- h. Providing alternate communication for other units in emergencies.



- i. Conducting limited offensive, defensive, and delaying actions as an economy of force.<sup>168</sup>

Besides the addition of security force operations and limited offensive and defensive operations, the characteristics of employment greatly altered the role of the former I&R platoon. FM 7-19 still stressed centralized control from the battle group level, but it also added independent actions: "Missions assigned the platoon may require it to operate at extended distances or beyond the supporting range of the battle group. The platoon is capable of independent action."<sup>169</sup> This reorganization allowed the new reconnaissance platoon to conduct some limited security operations for the battle group.

The PENTANA STUDY PART II, 1958: Recommendations for U.S. Army Force Structure in 1960-1970. Part one of the PENTANA Study was completed in 1957. It was designed to determine the best tactical organizations for both conventional and nuclear warfare. It had analyzed the test battle group organization in practice and evaluated it in training conventional and nuclear exercises. Overall, the report was generally quite optimistic about the capabilities of the tested battle group organization.<sup>170</sup>

There were several significant recommendations that were made in the PENTANA Part One study report. It outlined five requirements for war between 1960 and 1970. Most importantly, it maintained the requirement for vast tactical dispersion and independent operations below the division level. The study recommended: "The [continued] development of combat zone organizations which have the capability of unsupported self defense."<sup>171</sup> This requirement would propel the battle group organization into the early 1960's. It also supported the reduced

size of the infantry division. "The number of men engaged in the theater must be drastically reduced . . . . To offset this reduction in manpower, firepower, and mobility must be greatly increased."<sup>172</sup>

The U.S. Army's response to the requirement for increased firepower was grounded in the development and fielding of more tactical nuclear weapons. It had begun experimenting with tactical nuclear weapons for the infantry battalion commander a year before the PENTANA study was initiated.

Though not fielded until 1961, DAVY CROCKETT . . . was a 150-pound rocket that looked like a large mortar and lofted a miniature atomic warhead to a range of only a mile and a quarter. The initial intent was to provide a man-packed version of DAVY CROCKETT to all infantry battalions.<sup>173</sup>

In the area of enhanced tactical mobility for the tactical infantry formations mechanization had fared no better.

The mechanization of infantry--supposedly necessary to allow foot soldiers to survive and operate on a nuclear battlefield--made little progress. The Army's T113 armored personnel carrier (APC) spent most of the 1950s in development and still had not been fully fielded when the decade ended.<sup>174</sup>

While great new organizations and tactical concepts were printed on the pages of U.S. Army doctrine in the late 1950s, technological advances necessary to support these ideas lagged far behind. An officer of the period commented: "despite a greatly revised organization and tactical doctrine, combat units as usual are trying to do with the same old equipment until the new gear arrives."<sup>175</sup>

Perhaps the most important finding of the first PENTANA Study was the reinforcement of the greatly dispersed tactical operating distances between the battle groups. More than anything else this need for dispersion would secure the advancement of the battle group

organization. "Groups will be assigned zones of responsibility of up to 5,000 yards in width."<sup>176</sup> Conceptually, with five battle groups in a PENTOMIC division, the division would have been expected to attack in zone or defend in a sector of 20 to 25 kilometers. This was a radical departure from operations in WW II.

The mission of the battle group Headquarters and Service Company in 1957 foreshadowed the ultimate removal of the I&R /reconnaissance platoon from the battle group organization: [The Headquarters and Service company] "provides command, staff, special operations, communications, administration, supply, maintenance, medical support for the combat group."<sup>177</sup> It is important to note that intelligence collection and reconnaissance for the battle group were not included in this mission statement.

The first PENTANA study recommend that the reconnaissance platoon (that had initially been expanded with the development of the battle group), be removed from future battle group force structure.<sup>178</sup> The study recommended that the reconnaissance platoon in the battle group, be replaced with a special operations platoon.

The special operations platoon included in the [proposed] headquarters and service company [of the infantry battle group], provides substantially increased intelligence gathering and processing capability over that inherent to the current infantry battle group.<sup>179</sup>

The description of the specific capabilities of the special operations platoon was straight forward: [It was to be capable of] "Producing combat group level intelligence."<sup>180</sup> It was reorganized into a headquarters section of four personnel, a scout section of 15 personnel and a battlefield survey section of 13 personnel. It was to

be equipped with eight light armored vehicles (of an unspecified nomenclature) and three trailers.<sup>181</sup> (See Figure 12 for a line diagram of the proposed infantry battle group special operations platoon organization in 1960.)

The battlefield survey section was a unique technological departure from the human design of the battle group reconnaissance platoon. The section was to be organized and equipped to gather signal and communication intelligence. Presumably this was a technological supplement for the loss of human intelligence collection and reconnaissance. The PENTANA Study was generally vague as to the actual equipment with which the battlefield survey section was to be fielded.

Electronic warfare equipment is being developed to provide increased capability for search, detection, location and neutralizing of electromagnetic radiation. . . . The actual devices to be utilized at any particular echelon are determined by the needs, the personnel and logistic capability at each echelon.<sup>182</sup>

The PENTANA report did not go into the specific military occupational specialties of the battlefield survey section. Based on the proposed equipment allocations however and their implied technical nature it becomes clear that the battlefield survey section would probably have been manned by personnel with signal and intelligence training specialties. Based on that reorganization proposal, I estimate that the loss to infantry personnel force structure would have been between 10 and 15 enlisted infantry billets per reconnaissance platoon. That would leave only about 15 infantrymen in the proposed special operations platoon.<sup>183</sup> This would result in a fifty percent reduction of infantrymen from the previous infantry battle group reconnaissance platoon that had a TO&E authorization of 30 enlisted infantrymen.<sup>184</sup> It

is the nature of the United State's defense authorization, appropriation and spending process that force structure once lost is seldom regained without giving up other existing force structure. The original I&R platoon and the proposed PENTANA's battle group reconnaissance platoon's end was telegraphed by 1957.

The Rejection Of The PENTOMIC Concept, And The Return To The Triangular Infantry Division: 1960 - 1965. The following is a brief chronology of the key events that impacted on the I&R platoon during this period:

- 1961 John F. Kennedy was elected as president of the U.S.A.
- 1961 President Kennedy announces the U.S.A.'s national security policy of flexible response, with both a conventional and nuclear force balance.
- 1961 The U.S. Army initiates a reorganization study of the army division (ROAD-Corps) for the period 1970-1980. The PENTOMIC Division structure abandoned.
- 1961 President Kennedy increases the U.S.A.'s military commitment to the Republic of South Vietnam.
- 1962 FM 100-5 Operations is re-written.
- 1962 FM 61-100 The Division is written.
- 1963 L. B. Johnson assumed the presidency.
- 1963 President Johnson announces U.S.A.'s the new national security policy of mutually assured destruction.
- 1963 The remaining scout section is removed from the infantry brigade structure. The battalion is reintroduced as the intermediate C2 headquarters.

"By 1960, the concept of massive retaliation had been thoroughly discredited."<sup>185</sup> At the same time the U.S. Army had decided

that the PENTOMIC division was hardly capable of fighting in anything but a nuclear environment.<sup>186</sup>

Equally serious questions arose about the practicality of the PENTOMIC organization. Operational command of a division designed for optimum flexibility turned out in the field to be awkward and unwieldy. The span of control demanded of commander's exceeded the capability of even the most able. Reflecting the absence of an intermediate brigade or regimental echelon, the division commander found himself directly concerned with the activities of as many as 16 different subordinate units. And the structure of the battle group itself, whatever its presumed merit in a nuclear environment, proved ill-suited for conventional operations. Units did not acquire a genuine dual capability. Instead, they found themselves organized almost exclusively for nuclear war even as expectations grew that the next war would be non-nuclear. . . . To make matters worse, the PENTOMIC division's increased foxhole strength proved illusory. As organized, the division proved unable to sustain itself during continuous operations. Commander's resorted to stripping combat units to bolster service support elements too weak to support the division.<sup>187</sup>

Almost as quickly as the PENTOMIC concept was adopted, it was abandoned by the U.S. Army. "Senior leaders . . . turned on the PENTOMIC experiment with surprising vehemence."<sup>188</sup> General Paul L. Freeman's view was stated as; "Every time I think of the . . . PENTOMIC division, I shudder. Thank God we never had to go to war with it."<sup>189</sup> Perhaps the most succinct assessment of the PENTOMIC division, came from General Donald V. Bennett, who characterized it as an experiment to say; "Yes, the Army has moved into the nuclear age."<sup>190</sup> The bitterness expressed toward the PENTOMIC division by the U.S. Army's senior leadership at the time, probably fueled the rapid re-acceptance of the triangular infantry division.

The U.S. Army reacted quickly to develop another tactical organization to replace the PENTOMIC division.

At the president's directive, another major Army-wide reorganization began in 1961 under an entirely new concept called ROAD--

Reorganization Objective Army Division. In converting to the ROAD concept the Army returned to the triangular pattern that had been part of the World War II and Korean War organization structure. The ROAD division consisted of three combat brigades plus a headquarters along with assigned and organic supporting units. ROAD dropped the battle group and made the battalion the infantry's basic tactical and administrative unit. The brigades were seen as [more] flexible units that could adapt to accepting as many battalions as the tactical situation might require in any mixture of infantry, mechanized, armored and airborne battalions. Theoretically, the ROAD division could fire nuclear or conventional weapons as the mission and the President directed. The ROAD division numbered approximately 15,000 soldiers which was substantially larger than the [approximately 8,000 soldiers] PENTOMIC division.<sup>191</sup>

S.L.A. Marshall was especially critical of the U.S. Army's apparent infatuation with its new family of tactical nuclear weapons:

The enemy seldom was so obliging as to provide a perfect nuclear target. In most conflicts since 1945 the enemy presented only elusive targets, often mingling with the civilian population and operating without fixed lines of communication. To go after such forces with atomic weapons, . . . would be like hunting fleas with an elephant gun.<sup>192</sup>

As quickly as the U.S. Army had groped around with a new tactical organization to fight on a nuclear battlefield, they dropped it. The U.S. Army eagerly returned to the tactical organization that they understood and perhaps more importantly was successful in its last conclusive victory, WW II.

Changes To U.S. Army Doctrine: 1960. In 1960, the 1957 version of FM 17-35, The Reconnaissance Battalion, was rewritten. It was re-titled the Armored Cavalry, Platoon, Troop and Squadron. Under the employment considerations in section IV of the 1960 manual, it described the employment considerations for the armored cavalry troop in the infantry division as follows: "The troop may be attached to the brigade, a battle group, or the armor battalion to perform reconnaissance and security and when control by the squadron would be

impractical."<sup>193</sup> With a nearly fifty percent reduction in the size of the experimental battle group reconnaissance platoon by 1960, the ability to task organize a divisional armored cavalry troop down to an infantry brigade appears to have been an acceptable replacement for the reduced organic intelligence collection and reconnaissance capability of the infantry brigade. The practical application of such a task organization was probably never tested in training.

In 1962, the U.S. Army's keystone manual FM 100-5 Operations, was again rewritten. It embraced the new national security policy of 'flexible response' over nuclear 'massive retaliation.' While the title of the new national security strategy suggested more of a balance between conventional and nuclear weapons, the U.S. Army still held a considerable reliance on nuclear fire power.

When the authority to employ these [nuclear] munitions is granted, the combat power available to commanders is increased tremendously and the capability of forces at all echelons is correspondingly enhanced in both offensive and the defensive combat.<sup>194</sup>

While the PENTOMIC division had proven ineffective as a tactical formation that could successfully fight on both an atomic and non-atomic battlefield, the U.S. Army still insisted on the 1950's dual capability:

The organization of Army forces must provide the capability to conduct successful operations in either a nuclear or non nuclear environment without a major change in organization and equipment.<sup>195</sup>

The strategy of flexible response put a renewed emphasis on the U.S. Army's conventional force structure. Yet the protection and mobility deemed necessary for a conventional infantry force to operate on a nuclear battlefield lagged far behind the 1962 doctrine. "Without protection and [enhanced] mobility, infantry is particularly vulnerable



to the effects of nuclear weapons."<sup>196</sup> While this was true in principle, it was still a long way from application on the battle field in 1962. In 1962, the FM 61-100 The Division, was rewritten. In its description of what the division base (troops) missions were it described the employment considerations for the division armored cavalry squadron. Characteristically absent from the infantry brigade force structure for the first time, was organic intelligence collection and reconnaissance support to the infantry brigade.<sup>197</sup>

Coincidentally, the same manual described the paramount importance of ground reconnaissance on both a conventional and atomic battlefield:

Aggressive ground reconnaissance is a positive means of determining disposition and identification of enemy forces. The greater the dispersion of the battlefield, the greater is the requirement for reconnaissance and the more readily patrols can penetrate and develop enemy positions.<sup>198</sup>

There is an apparent paradox in this keystone doctrinal manual. While it reinforced the importance of reconnaissance for the division as a tactical formation, it no longer included direct support to the subordinate infantry brigades. At the same time, the remaining human intelligence collection and reconnaissance capability was reduced to only a section in the infantry brigade T0&E.

The Last Infantry Brigade Scout Section. The infantry brigade organization described in FM 7-30, the Infantry, Airborne, And Mechanized Division Brigades of 1962, was not a large departure from previous organizations and equipment. (See charts thirteen and fourteen for a line diagram of the infantry brigade headquarters company, and the infantry brigade scout section's organization in 1962.) While a much

smaller organization, its equipment was not dissimilar from the formations that preceded it. "Equipment and weapons of the section consist of four 1/4 ton trucks, four 7.62-mm machine-guns, two rocket launchers 3.5 in., and two grenade launchers M79."<sup>199</sup> Radio communications remained consistent with previous formations. They retained both a mounted and dismounted communication capability.<sup>200</sup>

The infantry brigade scout section of 1960 was designed to have the following capabilities:

1. Limited reconnaissance and patrolling missions for the brigade, using organic vehicles or aircraft assigned to the aviation platoon.
2. Man a brigade observation post.
3. Security for the brigade command post or other installations.
4. Maintaining contact with adjacent or attached units.
5. Operating as motor messengers when this use is mandatory.<sup>201</sup>

Difficulty in command and control of the infantry brigade scout section also forecasted the scout section's loss of importance in the brigade's war fighting combat power. As described under command and control of the scout section in the same field manual, the headquarters commandant of the infantry brigade was assigned primacy in command and control:

The headquarters commandant controls the scout section for all of its activities except reconnaissance and patrolling; the latter being supervised by the brigade S2.<sup>202</sup>

By 1965, the infantry brigade reconnaissance section was completely removed from the infantry brigade's TO&E. (See Chart 15 for a line diagram of the infantry brigade organization in 1965.) The

thirty year existence of a brigade level human intelligence collection and reconnaissance organization was brought to a close with the advent of this reorganization of the infantry brigade.

### Endnotes

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5. FM 7-25, 1942, p. 34-35.
6. Ibid., p. 35-36.
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10. John M. Sword, Grumpy's Trials or With the I&R Platoon, 315th Infantry Regiment in WW II (Manhattan, Kansas: Sunflower University Press, 1988).
11. FM 7-25, 1942, p. 19-25.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., p. 9.
14. FM 7-40, 1942, p. 47, 84, 90, 98, 171.
15. The 1942 version of FM 100-15, Division Operations, prescribed operating frontages for the division's reconnaissance formations of 30 to 50 miles in width, and depths of up to 150 miles forward of the infantry division.
16. FM 7-25, 1942, p. 22-23.

17. John M. Sword, Grumpy's Trials or With the I&R Platoon, 315th Infantry Regiment in WW II (Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 1988).

18. FM 7-25, 1942, p. 19-23.

19. FM 7-25, 1942, p. 20.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

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## CHAPTER FIVE

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Units generally identified a need for an independent intelligence gathering unit, to include aerial remotely piloted vehicles at [the] brigade [level]. Brigade intelligence requirements had to be gathered by subordinate battalion scout platoons which limited [the] battalion commander's options. A reliable, responsive means of gathering information [for] brigade intelligence requirements is needed.<sup>1</sup> (DESERT STORM Infantry Lesson Learned)

The Hypothesis: The U.S. Army Infantry Regiment's I&R platoon was removed from the U.S. Army force structure based on the changing world threats posed by the Korean and Cold War era which the U.S. Army had the responsibility to fight and win. The research and analysis of over fifty different books, field manuals, after-action and study reports all appear to support the original hypothesis of this thesis. I believe the loss of the I&R platoon was an unexpected victim of U.S. Army reorganization in an attempt counter world threats.

Throughout the combat of WW II, the infantry regiment's I&R platoon served as the primary human intelligence collection and reconnaissance organization for the regimental commander. Up until the advent of the Korean War the infantry regiment largely retained the same table of organization, equipment and mission. Although like the rest of the U.S. Army, they were not manned or equipped at full authorization due to political decisions by the United States Congress to reduce defense spending.

The tactics for the employment of the I&R platoon as written in the U.S. Army doctrinal field manuals of the same two periods, did not offer any suggestion that the I&R platoon would be employed any differently in support of the infantry regiment. The personal account of one I&R platoon squad leader in WW II suggested that they were employed in accordance with the doctrine described in the U.S. Army field manuals of the period. Another account of an I&R platoon member from the Korean War suggested that the nature of the terrain and enemy in that war required the employment of his I&R platoon to deviate from published U.S. Army doctrine. The fixed lines of entrenchment and the positional stalemate of the Korean War relegated one I&R platoon to patrol for enemy infiltrators behind the front lines--in the rear--and not in accordance with the published U.S. Army doctrine of the period. While this was only one personal war time experience, it does suggest that the change in conditions of the battlefield still affected the employment of tactical forces. Infantry regimental commander's did with what they had, and employed their allocated forces in order to accomplish their assigned tactical missions. And, just as the Korean War was coupled to the Cold War, the I&R platoon was linked to the infantry regiment's transition to fight on the cold war battlefield.

The infantry regiment's employment was very different in the Korean War, as compared to WW II. The terrain very much restricted mechanized and armored maneuver by large tactical formations that were common and successful in WW II. As such, the infantry regimental commander's responsibilities had changed. They were no longer responsible for large mechanized attacks that required extensive and

accurate human intelligence about the enemy on a distant objective. While not by choice, the infantry regimental commander's role changed from one of fighting his attacking infantry battalions, to one of resourcing his defending infantry battalions. The infantry companies and battalions conducted most all of the minor offensive operations during the Korean War. The infantry battalion reconnaissance platoons apparently proved adequate to meet their intelligence collection and reconnaissance needs for these operations.

The adage that the 'U.S. Army is best prepared to fight the last war' was probably born out of the Korean War. In a period of greatly reduced defense spending and a predominantly western focus on the threat of the Soviet Union, the Korean War was viewed by most political and some military leaders as side show. The Korean War was seen as an anomaly; a unique military situation. The common belief of the period was that 'next real war' would necessarily include and be won with nuclear weapons. Conventional forces were seen as necessary but not decisive in future ground combat.

The predominance of the U.S. Air Force as an armed service and its apparent priority in defense spending, as well as the belief that the technological solution for warfare during this period would be delivered by the U.S. Air Force also impacted on the U.S. Army. The U.S. Army had been playing catch-up to the U.S. Air Force since its creation as a separate branch of the armed forces. Technology was seen as the key to success in all future wars. The U.S. Air Force was viewed as being on the leading edge of technology.



The U.S. Army had always relied on firepower over maneuver to win its ground wars. The U.S. Army treated tactical nuclear weapons no differently. They were only the definition of the maximum application of firepower.

The trend in increased volume of fire culminated in an army's ability to deliver tactical nuclear weapons. Of course, with the increase in fire volume came corresponding changes in other areas of land combat: the use of entrenchments, the development of protected spaces on the battlefield, such as the tank and infantry fighting vehicles, and organizational changes such as the US PENTOMIC division of the 1950s and the flexible division structure of the 1970s and 1980s. These evolution's affected not only weapons, equipment organization and tactics, but also planning factors like casualty rates, supply rates and a balance among combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) forces.<sup>2</sup>

The ability to employ nuclear munitions as just another weapon for the conventional battlefield fostered an initial sense of indomintability in U.S. Army. Through tactical nuclear weapons the U.S. Army sought to once again become the predominant arm of the United States military. For the U.S. Army firepower had always been the key to success, regardless of its opponent. Nuclear weapons had tremendously increased tactical firepower. By the late 1950s the U.S. Army had harnessed that firepower. It went as far as to develop new doctrine and tactical organizations to support their employment. Interestingly, the U.S. Army had gone even further and allowed technology, (which had not changed any of the accepted western principles of war to date), to drive the reorganization of all the combat proven tactical fighting formations to that date.

Despite all the tests and evaluations of the late 1950s, the infantry battle group was considered a failure from almost every perspective. Almost as quickly as it was adopted, it was abandoned.

The combat proven triangular infantry division structure with a minimum of three brigades, was re-adopted by the U.S. Army in the early 1960s.

Unfortunately, this research did not uncover any specific documents that codified the specific reason that the I&R platoon was finally removed from the infantry brigade force structure. The impact of the PENTOMIC experiment was by far the most influential. Through the course of the PENTOMIC experiment to redesign the infantry division, the I&R platoon was gradually increased in size and capability, ultimately it resembled a small division cavalry organization.

The PENTANA studies completely reorganized the I&R platoon and expanded its mission. Its reorganization included organic tanks and mortars in order to be able to provide security as well as a reconnaissance capability to the infantry battle group commander. Apparently, the overriding necessity for dispersion on an atomic battlefield and the U.S. Army's reliance on tactical nuclear firepower placed the need for tactical human reconnaissance second to the security and protection of the battle group.

Obviously this organization proved less effective or productive than its designers envisioned. The removal of the battalion as a command and control echelon completely disrupted the command, control, and capabilities of the U.S. Army infantry division. While I found nothing in any published study or reports to formally document the shortcomings or failures of the PENTOMIC I&R platoon, it can be inferred that the I&R platoon, like the entire PENTOMIC battle group was probably over extended in both time, space and especially communication

capability, to successfully influence the fight for a battle group commander.

During the second half of the PENTOMIC experiment, the strength of the I&R platoon was nearly reduced to its 1935 level. The incorporation of the battlefield survey section was an early attempt to capitalize on technology to supplement the human intelligence and reconnaissance organizations. Apparently this reduced the infantry military occupational specialties within the I&R platoon to only squad or section size. The responsibilities of the battlefield survey section were apparently quite technical. The equipment that they would use was provided by the signal and military intelligence battalions within the infantry division. Accordingly, those personnel billets were lost on the infantry population as a whole.

The I&R platoon's battlefield survey section did not survive the PENTOMIC experiment either. Those specific military occupational specialty personnel billets were transferred back to the intelligence and signal battalions of the infantry division. Because the U.S. Army of the early 1960s was faced with a period of little or no expansion in defense spending, it can be deduced that the remaining infantry I&R platoon billets were exchanged for other U.S. Army force structure. What remained of the I&R platoon was a very small infantry scout section. With only twelve personnel it was probably too small to be of much use to the infantry brigade commander. With the mechanization of the majority of most infantry divisions such a small infantry reconnaissance formation probably was of little use to an infantry brigade commander.

At the same time, the infantry division reconnaissance battalion was reorganized during the period between WW II and the Korean War. It became a modified armored cavalry squadron. It was designed, organized and equipped for both reconnaissance and security operations in direct support of the infantry division. By doctrine it was designed and equipped to support both the division and its major subordinate commands (the infantry brigades). While that was its published doctrinal role, this research found nothing to document that a direct support relationship ever existed between an armored cavalry troop or squadron and an infantry brigade in training or in actual combat.

The political and economic factors that influenced the U.S. Army during the research period cannot be underestimated. After 1945 and up until the end of WW II, the United State's largest expenditure from the federal budget was for national defense. The American public's outcry for reduced federal expenditures on national defense in the late 1950's had a significant impact on the expansion or development of any new U.S. Army force structure.

The primacy of the U.S. Air Force as an armed service and the desire for a neat and clean technical solution to future wars in an effort to avoid the U.S. Army's unfortunate positional stalemate of the Korean War, pointed toward tactical nuclear weapons as the ultimate panacea. U.S. Army tactical firepower had won WW II. The U.S. Army's superiority in tactical firepower had also prevented a complete rout and the ultimate defeat of the United Nation's forces in South Korea. The U.S. Army looked upon tactical nuclear firepower as the singular great equalizer. With nuclear weapons, the United States could offset NATO's

divisional inferiority in ground forces over the central plains of Europe. As an unpredicted aside, nuclear weapons may have changed the face of conventional warfare forever.

They may have marked the close of the age of mass-warfare, of conflicts in which the fully--mobilized populations of industrialized countries had devoted their full energies to overthrowing one another.<sup>3</sup>

Since WW II there has been no complete mobilization of any country to fight a war. The threat of complete nuclear war has overshadowed all diplomacy. And yet, neither tactical nor strategic nuclear weapons have ever been used to resolve the numerous modern conflicts that have erupted since WW II.

The most significant impact to the U.S. Army was not the loss of the I&R platoon from the infantry regiment's force structure. Its loss was a symptom of a greater disease. The I&R platoon fell victim to a much larger illness, the loss of the support of the United States congress and people to support its national security and foreign policies.

Moreover the preservation of peace for three [plus] decades resulted, as it had after the Napoleonic Wars, in breeding of a generation uninterested in military affairs, skeptical of military virtues, and regarding the armed forces with a mixture of suspicion, incomprehension, and contempt.<sup>4</sup>

The similarities between the period researched here, and the future for the U.S. Army are not coincidental. Rather, they appear to be a rather predictable and cyclic phenomenon.

Nine years after the conclusion of World War I, the U.S. Army--long since largely demobilized and sliding toward record low budgets and total strength--was slipping into the time-honored mental and physical routines of garrison life. There was no threat on the horizon, none at least the American people wanted to notice, and so

there was no pressing or overt reason for those inside the Army to worry much about maintaining its warlike proficiency.<sup>5</sup>

The outcries from DESERT STORM for an addition to the infantry brigade's force structure to add another human intelligence collection and reconnaissance organization to the infantry brigade do not defy the principles of sound tactical operations. The idea that it would be desirable to have an organic human intelligence collection and reconnaissance organization in the infantry brigade again, does not however make it a mandatory requirement for future successful tactical military operations.

After all, the infantry brigade force structure has remained largely unchanged since the early 1960s--over 30 years. During this most modern period the infantry brigade has operated under a very wide variety of training and combat conditions. And generally with a consistent degree of tactical success, regardless of the battlefield conditions or opponent.

Further research into the integration or application of an organic infantry brigade intelligence collection and reconnaissance organization needs to be directed toward practical application and the realities of an additional brigade reconnaissance organization on the battlefield. Only through practical tests at the combat training centers will the merits of the heretofore academic and historical evaluations of such an organization be proven.

Finally, this historical research may contribute to the evolution of the infantry brigade in support of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's (TRADOC), directed Reconnaissance and Security Force Review. This study was initiated by General Frederick Franks,

commander of TRADOC after DESERT STORM in 1992, and continues to the date of the printing of this thesis. The TRADOC study was intended to assess the reconnaissance and security adequacy and requirements of each tactical echelon. At the date of publication no decision had been made to recreate an I&R platoon at the infantry brigade level.

Additional research might also include an investigation into the infantry brigade reconnaissance and security requirements, responsibilities and organizations during the period 1965 to 1992. During this period the cold war while avoided in Central Europe, was fought by infantry brigades in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Panama and in the Middle East. Examination into these periods may illuminate more fully why the present infantry brigade force structure may or may not still require an I&R platoon. The factors that led to the removal of the infantry regiment's I&R platoon were driven by changes in society, national security requirements and world threats. Combat experience in the Korean War did not appear to drive the reorganization of the infantry regiment's TO&E. Although the nature of war in that theater may have led to the doctrinal misuse of the I&R platoon. The combined effects of international politics, the rapid expansion of the world's super-power nuclear arsenals, the continued threat of conventional war and internal American politics over the thirty years from 1935-1965, all collided within the U.S. Army. While not a fatal crash for the U.S. Army as a whole, it did prove fatal for the infantry regiment's I&R platoon.

### Endnotes

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## APPENDIX A

### A COMPLETE CHRONOLOGY FOR CHAPTER FOUR

- 1939 The MANHATTAN project is initiated under President Roosevelt.
- 1939-41 The triangular infantry division is tested against the existing square infantry division.
- 1939 The I&R platoon TO&E is authorized 10 infantrymen.
- 1940 The I&R platoon TO&E is expanded to authorize 18 infantrymen.
- 1940 The Infantry Regimental Combat Team (RCT) concept developed.
- 1941 Sept. - Nov. U.S. Army GHQ Louisiana and Carolina Maneuvers are conducted.
- 1941 The I&R platoon TO&E is authorized 1/4 ton vehicles.
- 1942 FM 100-15, Division Operations is re-written.
- 1942 Field Service Regulation 100-15 Operations is rewritten.
- 1942 The U.S.A. enters WW II in North Africa.
- 1945 Aug. 6 & 9, the U.S.A. employs the first atomic weapons against Japan.
- 1945 The close of WW II hostilities. The U.S. Army had 6,100,000 personnel in 89 divisions. The Soviet Union retains 175 divisions capable of mobilization.
- 1947 U.S.A.'s defense policy is reorganized. The Air Force is established as an equal of the other armed services.
- 1948 The Soviet Union withdraws from Korea.
- 1948 The U.S. Air Force fields the B36A, the first intercontinental strategic bomber capable of delivering an atomic bomb overseas.
- 1948 24 June, the Berlin airlift begins.
- 1949 The NATO is established.

- 1949      The Soviet Union surprises the U.S.A. by successfully testing their first atomic weapon.
- 1950      On 25 June 9 Divisions of the NKPA Army (135,000), attack across the 38th parallel into south Korea.
- 1950      The U.S. Army's strength is 591,000, in 10 under strength divisions.
- 1950      Ranger battalions reorganized into separate ranger companies, and added to the Infantry division's TO&E.
- 1951      FM 17-35, The Reconnaissance Battalion is rewritten.
- 1952      Military Intelligence is established as its own corps.
- 1952      President Truman is defeated for re-election by President-Elect Eisenhower.
- 1953      The Armistice is signed in Korea.
- 1953      Dwight D. Eisenhower is elected president. The U.S.A.'s new national security policy of mass nuclear retaliation is adopted.
- 1953      The U.S. Army successfully fires the first tactical nuclear weapon from the 280MM atomic cannon.
- 1954      FM 100-5, Operations is re-written.
- 1954      The Eisenhower administration initiates the "New Look" policy to review the roles, missions and functions of the armed services.
- 1955      In July, during Operation GYROSCOPE, the 101st Airborne division conducts a strategic mobility test. They successfully deploy one RCT to Japan by air (9,000 miles) in 53 hours. They complete the exchange of the two RCTs by air in 11 days.
- 1955      Operation DESERT ROCK IV, TF Razor (3,000 soldiers) conducts a ground tactical operation after a nuclear weapon is detonated less than 1 kilometer from ground zero.
- 1955      The U.S. Army strength is 1.1 million.
- 1956      The U.S. Army initiates the PENTANA Study Phase I (5,5,5).
- 1956      The 101ST Airborne Division is reorganized as a PENTOMIC Division.
- 1957      The PENTANA Study Phase I is completed and Phase II is initiated. The focus is on the U.S. Army in 1960-70.

- 1957 The PENTANA Study Phase II recommends the Battle Group I&R platoon be reorganized into a special operations platoon with a scout section and a battlefield survey (EW) section.
- 1957 FM 17-35, The Reconnaissance Battalion, is rewritten.
- 1958 The U.S. Army strength is 899,000.
- 1960 The PENTANA Study is completed. It recommends increasing the span of control of the company, still absent a battalion C2 headquarters.
- 1960 FM 17-35, The Armored Cavalry Platoon, Troop and Squadron, is rewritten.
- 1961 John F. Kennedy is elected as president of U.S.A.
- 1961 President Kennedy announces the U.S.A.'s national security policy of flexible response with both a conventional and nuclear force balance.
- 1961 The U.S. Army initiates the reorganization study of the army division (ROAD-Corps) for the period 1970-1980. The PENTOMIC Division structure abandoned.
- 1961 President Kennedy increases the U.S.A.'s military commitment to the Republic of South Vietnam.
- 1962 FM 100-5, Operations is re-written.
- 1962 FM 61-100, The Division was written.
- 1963 L. B. Johnson assumes the presidency.
- 1963 President Johnson announced U.S.A.'s new national security policy of mutually assured destruction.
- 1963 The scout section was removed from the infantry brigade structure. The battalion was reintroduced as an intermediate C2 headquarters.
- 1967 Military Intelligence is converted to a combat support branch from a combat service support branch.
- 1969 Ranger companies moved from the division force structure to the corps and designated as LRRPs.

# APPENDIX B

## FIGURES




Figure 1. The Square Infantry Division, 1941. Source: Christopher R. Gabel, The U.S. Army GHQ Maneuver of 1941 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History United States Army, 1991), p. 10.




Figure 2. The Triangular Infantry Division, 1942. Source: Christopher R. Gabel, The U.S. Army GHQ Maneuver of 1941 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History United States Army, 1991), p. 11.




Figure 3. The Infantry Rifle Regiment, 1942. Source: United States War Department, FM 7-40, Rifle Regiment (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 9 February 1942), p. 3.




Figure 4. The I&R Platoon, 1942. Source: United States War Department, FM 7-25, Headquarters Company Intelligence and Signal Communication, Rifle Regiment (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 7 October 1942), p. 34-36.



Figure 5. Strategic Map of the Far East 1950. Source: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Korea-1950 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1952, Map 1, Inside Cover Illustration.




Figure 6. Infantry Regiment, 1950. Source: Department of the Army, FM 7-40, Infantry Regiment (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 3.




Figure 7. The Infantry Regiment Headquarters Company, 1950. Source: Department of the Army, FM 7-40, Infantry Regiment (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1950), p.2.




Figure 8. The I&R Platoon, 1950. Source: Department of the Army, FM 7-25, Headquarters Company Infantry Regiment [Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1950], p. 2.




Figure 9. The PENTOMIC Division, 1956. Source: Bacevich, A. J. The Pentomic Era: The U. S. Army Between Korea and Vietnam. New York: National Defense University, 1986, p. 107.






Figure 10. The Infantry Battle Group, 1959. Source: Headquarters Department of the Army, FM 7-40, Infantry and Airborne Division Battle Groups [Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the




Figure 11. The Infantry Battle Group Reconnaissance Platoon, 1959. Source: Department of the Army. FM 7-19, Combat Support Company Infantry Division Battle Group. Washington, D.C.: 1960, p. 51.




Figure 12. The Special Operations Platoon, 1960. Source: Department of the Army. FM 7-19, Combat Support Company Infantry Division Battle Group. Washington, D.C.: 1960.




Figure 13. The Infantry Brigade Headquarters Company, 1960. Source: Headquarters Department of the Army, Infantry and Airborne Division Battle Groups (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 20 August 1959), p. 6.




Figure 14. The Infantry Brigade Scout Section, 1960. Source: Headquarters Department of the Army, Infantry and Airborne Division Battle Groups (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 20 August 1959), p. 11 and 30.




Figure 15. The Infantry Brigade, 1965. Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 7-30, Infantry Airborne, and Mechanized Division Brigades (Washington, D.C., 19 May 1965), p. 13.

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